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ABSTRACT

This thesis critiques public finance economics from an Austrian school
perspective. The critique employs property rights and Austrian method and
econom ic theory.
Chapter I provides a brief discussion of Austrian method. This is an
im portant ch a p te r because most of the criticisms offered in this p a p e r
spring from the Austrian school's unique method.
C hapter ii explains the property theory th a t will be used throughout
this paper. This ch a p te r argues for an uncompromising property rights
theory that views the state as a criminal aggressor.
Chapter ill examines the foundations of pubiic finance and subjects
them to Austrian analysis, in some instances these theories will be critiqued
to the point th a t they are no longer of use to the analysis in Chapter IV. In
others, an improved Austrian version will be provided.
C hapter iV looks at specific theories within public finance and
explains how they fall short of value-free Austrian economics.

Ill
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INTRODUCTION

Unlike most sub-disciplines of economics, public finance oversteps
ttie bounds of value-free economics. On ttiis, Biock writes:
Not only is normative economics em braced, it is done so witti
aiocrity, and wittiout apoiogy. That is, most textbooks on the
subject start off the with one or several chapters w h ic h
a tte m p t to justify taxation on moral, efficiency, and other
grounds. This occurs in no other field.i
Not only do public finance authors casuaiiy moke vaiue judgments,
they provide no ethical foundation for doing so. This paper provides an
ethicai foundation com patible with the Austrian school of economics. This
foundation, com bined with Austrian m ethod, will be used to critique the
theories that justify taxation.

1Block, "Pubiic finance texts cannot justify government taxation," p. 225.
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CHAPTER \

AUSTRIAN METHOD

Austrians b elieve th e m ethods of th e n a tu ra l sciences are
inappropriate for the sciences of human action. What separates the social
sciences from the natural sciences is purposeful behavior: Human action is
m otivated and cannot be isolated in a laboratory, Or, as Mises writes: "We
are never in a position to observe the change in one elem ent only, all other
conditions of the event remaining unchanged."2
Another principle of the Austrian school is th a t of m ethodoiogicai
individualism, This principle is straightforward: Ail actions are performed by
individuals.3 The state, society or other groups do not hove ends, neither
d o they a ct.^ For exam ple, if a terrorist organization assassinates a
politician, it is not the organization th a t kills the politician but specific
individuals within the organization. The same principle applies to the state.
It is not th e United States th a t invades another country but specific
individuals in the armed forces acting on behalf of the government.
Since hum an a c tio n does not lend itself to em pirical testing
econom ic theory must be the produ ct of logical deduction. Austrian
theories are d e d uced from the incontestable axiom of action. This axiom
states that man acts, it may seem obvious and somewhat simplistic, but it
says far more than those unfamiliar with the axiom would e.xpect. implicit in
every a c tio n are th e categories of values, ends, m eans, c h o ic e ,
preference, cost, profit and loss, as well as tim e, tim e preference,
uncertainty and causality. These are not apparent until one understands
w hat it is to act. Until then, the actions of individuals a p p e a r merely as
motions.5
2Mises, Human Action, p. 31.
3|bid„ p. 42.
^Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, p. 2.
SHoppe, Praxeology and Econom,\c Science, p. 21
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Every action is on a tte m pt to remove uneasiness. An individual acts
because tie wisties to m ove from a less satisfactory state to a more
satisfactory one. in doing so, tie must utilize scarce resources. These must
include at least time, his body and the land upon which it stands.
Why one chooses one action over another is not the subject of
economics, but of psychology, it is unimportant to the economist to know
w hy a ch o ice was m ade. All tha t matters to him Is th a t a choice was
made.
An individual must choose how to em ploy his means. Will they be
em ployed to get a sandwich or go to the movies? This will depend on the
valuations of the actor. At any point in time an actor has a ranking of oil
courses of action under his consideration. This list is ranked ordinaily and not
set in stone. For example, at one point in time, the individual may value
drinking beer more than working. At another point in time, the ranking may
be reversed. These scales only manifest themselves In human action.
O nce the a c to r chooses his most valued option he must also
determine how to attain it, A plan is needed. The most valued recipe is the
one that will be selected. The actor must also evaluate and attain control
over the means called for in this recipe so that he may attain his end.*
Objects are not means because of their chem ical or physical composition.
It is the human mind th a t makes an ob je ct a means and human action
which implements the means.
Ends ca n either be Interm ediate or terminal. For exam ple, the
atta in m e n t of a master's degree can be an interm ediate end with the
terminal end being the attainm ent of a doctorate. But each end is sought
after because the actor believes once it is reached it will leave him in a
more satisfactory state of affairs.
By choosing one action over another an actor shows preference. If
the action chosen does not remove the actor's uneasiness, he incurs a
psychic loss. Conversely, if the action removes the uneasiness then the
actor reaps a psychic profit.
it is important to note that an individual not only attempts to maximize
his m oney income, he attem pts to maximize his psychic incom e and this
includes m oney os well os n o n e x c h a n g e a b le goods.
These
*Herbener, "The Role of Entrepreneurship in Desocialization," p. 80.
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nonexchangeable goods consist of subjective nontangible elements that
cannot be separated from certain actions,
For example, an individual may have the opportunity to work for two
organizations, one the state, the other a private firm. The Incom e the
individual could earn in the state position may be twice that of the private
sector job. But the individual m ay loathe the state so much th a t any
increase in incom e over the private sector job cannot entice him to take
the state position. FIis action is com pletely rational. By choosing the private
sector job, his psychic incom e is maximized. Given the choice between
tw o positions, on actor will choose the position with the highest monetary
income, ceteris paribusJ
Action implies causality. By acting an individual demonstrates that he
believes he can interfere in the con cate na tion of events and a ffe c t
change. One would not a c t if he thought he was powerless over the world
around him.
That one must choose w hat to do at any point in time proves the
existence of uncertainty. Without uncertainty man would never hove to
affirm one path of action and deny another, Fie would merely go through
life as an automaton, never having to choose.
That one consumes proves the universal fa ct of time preference, i.e,
he prefers obtaining a go o d in the present more to receiving the some
good in the future. If this preference did not exist, the actor could abstain
from consum ption indefinitely.® Because of this preference, ail goods
received in the future trade at a discount to the same good in the present.
An Individual who placed a large discount on goods received in the future
would have a high time preference and one who placed a small discount
on future goods would have a low time p r e f e r e n c e . 9
7Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, pp. 183,186,191.
®Mises, Human Action, p. 484.
9Time preferences determ ine the ratio of consumption to investment. The
lower the time preference, the greater the proportion of money aiiocated
to investment, and vice-versa. These preferences ch a n g e throughout
one's life. Children have high time preferences. They would rather spend
money right aw ay instead of waiting for a future return. Later in life, time
preferences tend to lower os Individuals mature and as providing for one's
future comes into ploy. At retirement, time preferences tend to raise as
one has little tim e left to live and money unspent after death will be of no
value. This increase may be m oderated by bequests. The degree to which

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The action axiom provides a soiid and irrefutable foundation for the
entire edifice of economics because one ca n n o t a tte m p t to dispute it
without a t the same time proving it. To disprove the axiom one would hove
to em ploy scarce resources (at least time, one's body and the land upon
which it stands) and utilize them to attain the end of disproving the axiom.
One would have to act. Theories th a t flow from the action axiom are o
priori and must logically foiiow unless a flaw in the reasoning e x i s t s . This
process of d e d u ctio n is co ile d praxeology. Economics is the most
developed branch of praxeology.

Theory of Subjective Value
The full integration of the subjective theory of value into econom ic
theory differentiates Austrians from non-Austrians. Austrians shun the
c o n c e p t of o bjective costs w hether they be social costs, benefits or
transaction costs. They are all equally invalid.n These concepts cannot be
derived praxeoiogicaily and are therefore of no im po rtan ce to the
Austrian. This, no doubt, prevents m any econom ic errors from the start.
The cost of any action is the most valued opportunity foregone, the
opportunity cost. Opportunity costs vary from individual to individual and
have values atta ch ed to them tha t cannot be measured in any objective
sense. They c a n n o t be a d d e d , measured, nor co m pa re d b e tw e e n
individuals. Murray N. Rothbard illustrates:
His [an actor's] cost is his second-highest ranking end, th a t Is,
the value of the highest ranking end that he has foregone to
achieve a still more highly valued goal. The cost that he incurs
in his decision, then is only ex ante; as soon os his decision is
m a d e and the c h o ic e is exercised a nd his resource
com m itted, the cost disappears, it becom es on historical
cost, forever bygone. And since it is impossible for any
external observer to explore, a t a later date, or even a t the
governm ent subsidizes retirement also has an effect on time preference as
do taxes. Many factors play a role in the form ation of one's time
preference. See T. Alexander Smith, Time and Public Policy and Edward C.
Banfield, The Unheaveniy City Revisited.
lORoppe, Praxeology and Economic Science, p. 24
n Rothbard, "The Present State of Austrian Economics," p. 9.
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same time, the internai m entai processes of the actor, it is
impossible for this observer to determine, even in principle
what the cost of any decision may have b e e n . ''2
Utility is necessarily subjective and unmeasurable. For something to
be measurable, it must be extensive in space so everyone con agree to
the size of the unit in question. Utility's intensive nature does not lend itself to
extensive observation and m e a s u re m e n t.A s s u m in g this restriction did
not exist, any unit of m easurement would still be entirely arbitrary as
different individuals would place different values on the unit of measure.
Cardinal utility measurement has no legitimate place in economics.
The low of decreasing marginal utility is derived praxeoiogicaily. The
first unit of a homogeneous supply of goods will be put to the actor's mostvalued use. The second such good will be put to use for the actor's
second-highest valued end, and so on. The first homogeneous good will
then have the highest value of the group, os it will be used to attain the
actor's highest valued end. The second will hove a lower value, as the end
to which it con be applied is ranked lower. This is true because at any point
in time on actor has a unitary scale of choices.
It is im portant to understand w hat an acto r determines to be a
hom ogeneous supply of goods is not d e c id e d by some physical or
chem ical criteria, it is entirely subjective. For example, an actor may have
a supply of guns, oil of which are physically different. But to him, ail may be
of equal serviceability, in this case, even though the guns are physically
different, the actor considers them homogeneous. A supply of goods is
considered homogeneous from the viewpoint of the actor if, to him, they
are of equal serviceability.
if one has to give up a unit of a homogeneous supply, he will give up
the one applied to his lowest-valued end. As this unit is given up, the value
a tta ch e d to the marginal unit of his supply has increased as it now has a
higher value a tta ch ed to it than the end that could be achieved with an
additional unit. This is the law of increasing marginal utility.

i2Rothbard, "The Myth of Efficiency," p. 93
T3Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction o f Utiiity and Welfare Economics, p.
18.
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The law of marginal utiiity has nothing to do with the psychological law
of satiety of wonts. Each subsequent good of a homogeneous supply has a
lower value a tta ch e d to it because it ca n only be applied to uses the actor
deems less im portant than his most valued end. The law of marginal utility is
entirely praxeoiogicai.i^
From the law of marginal utility, the laws of supply and dem and are
iogicaiiy deduced. These laws hold in ail situations and cannot be refuted
by historical experience.

Voluntary Exchange
When tw o actors engage in bilateral exchange, it is because they
believe they will benefit ex on fe from th a t exchange. Exchange requires
reverse preference orderings, th a t is, Actor A values what he is to receive
from Actor B more than what he gives up, and vice-versa. Without reverse
p re fe re n ce orderings (e xcept in cases of involuntary exchange) an
exchange would not take place.
Thus, one con soy with o p o d ictic certainty ail voluntary action ex
a n te accrues psychic profit to all parties in the exchange. Of course, one
or more of the actors may realize ex post they have not benefitted. Man's
lack of omniscience prevents him from always making the right choice. But
this is in no w ay limited only to the free market; it plagues all m an-m ade
institutions.
The free market minimizes mistakes by providing an immediate test: If
an individual purchases an item he does not like, he knows in the future that
he o u ght not purchase it ag ain .
Furthermore, p rivate consum er
organizations and publications help individuals determ ine w hether a
purchase will m eet their expectations.
1'* Samuelson writes: "As you consume more of the same good, your total
(psychological) utility increases. However, let us use the term marginal utility
to refer to 'the extra utility added by one extra last unit of a good.' Then with
successive new units of the good, your total utility will grow a t a slower and
slower rate because of a fundam ental te n d e n cy for your psychological
ability to a p p re cia te more of the good to becom e less keen." (Economics
[1976], p. 433.)
TSRothbard, Power and Market, p. 20.
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Ceteris paribus
Ttie deductive nature of econonnics places great im portance on ttie
cefe/’/ spo/’/bus restriction, it is essential to any praxeoiogicai analysis and its
careful use differentiates ttie Austrians from others. Since the econom y
c a n n o t be isolated like atoms in a scientist's la b o ra to ry , th o u g h t
experiments using this restriction are integral to Austrian theory. Economists
must m entally theorize a change in the econom y (a price control, for
example) while holding ail other variables constant and then logically
deduce its effects, in this sense, economics is truly an armchair science.
No experimentation or field work is required.i* Ail praxeoiogicaily derived
econom ic theories are true ceteris paribus.

Wertfreiheiti7
Economics is a science of means not ends. It cannot tell us whether
the ends are just or good, only if the means em ployed are appropriate to
achieve the ends desired.i® in addition, an economist ca nn ot conclude
that a certain policy or action must be undertaken without smuggling a
norm into his reasoning: Value judgments do not foiiow from strictly
econom ic statements.^ 9

i*Statistics do have a use, although a limited one, in economics. They can
illustrate but not prove a theory because correlation is not causation.
Furthermore, their use, like that of historical events, can make economics
more interesting.
''^Neutrality with regard to all value judgments.
'®Mises, Theory and History, pp. 28-29.
'^Hoppe, A Theory o f Socialisrvi and Capitalism, p. 194.
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other Schools of Thought
M ethod separates Austrian econom ics from other schools.
The process by which praxeoiogicai theories develop Is outlined as
foiiows;2o
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Axioms
Deduction
Laws
Understanding
Historical analysis

This is in contrast to how theories develop from empiricism-positivism:
1. Assumptions
2. Deductions
3. Lows
4. Testing
5. Empirical facts
6. Historical episodes
Praxeoiogicai and empiricist-positivist theories also differ in the nature
of their pronouncements. Theories deduced from the axiom of action ore
qualitative in nature as opposed to the quantitative nature of empiricistpositivist theories. But this is not because Austrian theories are somehow
deficient or inferior. Rather, Austrians posit that individuals don't respond to
the world around them like robots. Their actions change over time with
changes in tastes and knowledge, individuals can respond to the some set
of circumstances differently over time. This point is illustrated by Mises:
Deluded by the idea that the sciences of human action must
a p e the technique of the natural sciences, hosts of authors
are intent upon a quantification of economics. They think that
economics ought to imitate chemistry, which progressed from
a qualitative state to a quantitative state. Their m otto is the
positivistic maxim: Science is measurement. Supported by rich
funds, they are busy reprinting and rearranging statistical data
2®This is taken from a lecture on m ethod by J. Herbener a t the Mises
University 1990.
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p ro vid e d by governm ents, tra d e associations, a n d by
corporations and other enterprises. They try to com pute the
arithm etical relations am ong various of these d ata and thus to
determ ine w hat they call, by a nalogy with th e n a tu ra l
sciences, correlations and functions. They faii to realize that in
the field of human action statistics is always history and that the
alleged "correlations" and "functions" do not describe anything
else than w hat hap p e ne d a t a definite time in a definite
geographical area as the outcom e of the actions of a definite
num ber of people. As a m e tho d of e co n o m ic analysis
econom etrics is a childish play with figures th a t does not
co ntribute anything to the elucidation of th e problems of
econom ic reoiity.^i
The present, or the im mediate past, is part of history. History cannot
prove or disprove a theory; it can only illustrate a theory. History is full of
events that follow one another. Any relationship betw een tw o or more
events can be found. In addition, every historical experience is open to
myriad interpretations. Economic history has no theoretical im portance
w ithout praxeology. Praxeology, not history, must be used to form
econom ic theories.
Empirical theories con never be as certain as those of praxeology for
they are forever hypothetical. Some variable can always be discovered
th a t m ight exercise some control over the elem ents explained. To
empiricists and positivists, even the low of dem and is empirical. As an
empirical law, it is subject to falsification if contrary evidence is discovered.
To the praxeologist, the law of dem and is known with op od ictic certainty
and c a n n o t be disproved by any historical evidence, it holds so long os
individuals act.
Similarly, empiricist-positivists consider the theory of voluntary
exchange hypothetical, is testing required to determine that both parties
exp e ct to benefit, have opposite preference orderings and exchange
goods of unequal value? This is absurd to anyone who knows w hat it is to
act.
This is not the place to go into on in-depth discussion of empiricismpositivism. Nor is this the purpose of this thesis. Suffice to say, these theories

21Mises, The Ulfimafe FoundatiGn o f Economic Science, p. 63.
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have been severely riddled with holes, yet they nevertheless remain today's
prominent methods ,22
The reliance on em piricism -positivism as a m e th o d o io g ic a i
foundation has no doubt played a role in the negative view of economists
held by the pubiic. Economists, with their countless quantitative predictions,
hove led m any to discount oil econom ic assertions as mere conjecture.
This has had an enormous im pact on the type of policies supported by the
pubiic os they eschew sound econom ic principles and rely on gut feelings
instead for the outcomes of potentiaiiy disastrous econom ic policies.

22$ee, in particular, Hoppe, Praxealogy and Economic Science.
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CHAPTER II

PROPERTY RIGHTS

Central to any schiool of economics, but conspicuously missing from
most, is a coherent theory of property rights. The theory used for this thesis
is th a t developed in Hans-Hermann Hoppe's A Theory o f Socialism and
Capitalism. The theory is called argumentation ethics and is summarized as
foilows.23
Scarcity necessitates a system of property rights. That all goods are
not superabundant, such that one's consumption does not limit or reduce
one's or another's future consumption, is bound to cause conflict. Property
rights would be unnecessary in a Garden of Eden, where oil goods exist in
superabundance, as no conflicts over use would o r is e . 2 4
But property rights ore required for people's bodies. Bodies ore
scarce resources, i m ay wish to do something with my body while another
m ay also wish to d o something with it a t the same time. Conflicts are
inevitable. Property rights are necessary to avoid these conflicts.
Ail truth claims (including the petitioning of rights) must be brought
a b out and d e cid e d upon through the process of argum entation. This
statem ent, like the axiom of action, renders oil co u n te r argum ents
contradictory. To argue against it, one would hove to orgue the truth claim
that one does not hove to bring truth claims about through argumentation.
No one would ever e n g a g e in argum ent if he did not implicitly
believe intersubjectively meaningful norms existed. For example, no one
would argue if they believed the other party would resort to murder if a
23See, in particular, c h a p te r 7; Hoppe "The Justice of E c o n o m ic
Efficiency,"and "The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic."
Hoppe's derivation of property rights is exclusive to him but his conclusions
ore not. See Rothbard, For A New Liberty and The Ethics of Liberty.
24Here the Garden of Eden means only a land of superabundance. No
other Biblical connotations are impiied.

12
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disagreement was reached. Arguing assumes both parties can agree to
disagree.
What are the criteria used to determine these norms? First, they must
pass the universalization test, i.e., the norms must apply equally to all parties
without exception. Passing the universalization test is necessary - but not
sufficient - os any num ber of norms, no m atter how senseless or
contradictory, could be formulated to conform with this rule. For example,
norms requiring everyone to smoke while simultaneously requiring th a t ail
smokers be punished would both pass this test.
Everyone, while arguing, assumes he has exclusive control over his
body. Moreover, it is assumed neither party will kill or otherwise physicoiiy
harm the other. This follows from the nature of argum entation os a
practical affair and conflict-free m ethod of interacting.
This norm, summed by the non-aggression principle, also passes the
universalization test. The principle states everyone is free to do whatsoever
he desires with his property, so long as he does not uninvitedly aggress
against the physical integrity of another person's property (note that one's
body is the most basic form of private property), in addition, any a c t
delimiting an individual's right to a c t non-invasiveiy would be considered an
invasion.
It must be noted th a t one can only own the physical integrity of his
property and not the value of it. Values are subjective and im puted onto
goods and services through the valuations of individuals. These values can
change from one m om ent in time to another, if one had the right to own
the value of property, an individual could resort to coe rcion if the
valuations of others changed and lowered his property values.
The same analysis can be applied to the value of one's services, if
producer B entered the m arket and thereby low ered the value of
producer A's services, A would have the right to stop B from invading his
value. The mere existence of another individual on the labor market (or
any other market for th a t matter) could be considered an a c t of invasion.
The only w ay to rectify this "invasion" is to permanently maim the second
laborer to prevent him from working or to kill him. But this contradicts the
norms implicit in argumentation.
Moreover, the right to own one's value or the value of one's property
implies that before anyone could a c t he would have to check with oil
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others to determine whether his actions wouid reduce the value of anyone
else's property. By the tim e he had finished questioning everyone, their
values could have changed. Ail action wouid com e to a shrieking halt.
What of property rights referring to things other than individuals?
Individuals must be able to ap pro p ria te goods to survive. To argue
otherwise would be self-contradictory because to argue, one has to be
olive, and to be alive, one has to hove consumed resources.
There are tw o m ethods of a p p ro p ria tin g u n o w n e d goods:
hom esteading and verbal declaration. No m iddle ground exists. The
principle of verbal declaration fails the rigor of argumentation ethics since it
wouid never be agreed upon through the course of argum entation, if
both parties held this principle, then the first to state he owned the other
would be the rightful owner of the other. (The same ta ctic could be used
to appropriate all the property of another.) One party would be the master
and the other the slave. But this contradicts a norm implicit in all acts of
argumentation, the right of seif-ownership.
In addition, before one could even invoke the principle of verbal
declaration, he wouid hove to assume control over his body. One cannot
declare ownership over things without using one's vocal chords. Therefore,
one ca n n o t assume property rights over himself through declaration but
only through homesteading.
Homesteading is the only just m ethod of appropriating property, it
establishes an objective, intersubjectively controllable link betw een a
person and his property. This principle simply states that the first-user of on
unow ned resource is its owner. The first user of a person's body is that
person. And the first user of any other property (unappropriated land, etc.)
is also its rightful owner.
Individuals cannot claim to lose from the homesteading done by
others because the fa c t th a t they did not hom estead those unow ned
resources tells us they did not view them as valuable. If they did, they
wouid have homesteaded them.
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Furthermore, the producer of a good is its rightful owner because
the good is his creation, He has transformed homesteaded resources by
"mixing" them with his labor in the Lockean s e n s e , 25
The p rin cip le of voluntary e x ch a n g e is a coroiiary of the
hom esteading principle. Individuals have the right to engage in any
bilateral exchange so long as the exchange does not violate the physical
integrity of an uninvoived third party or his property. Any attem pt to delimit
one's right to exchange would violate the nonaggression axiom.
Exchange under this system is essentially an exchange of property
titles. Contracts are enforced because the failure to uphold one's end of a
contract is tantam ount to theft. That is, one party has taken ownership of
another's property title, but has not relinquished the property title of the
good he agreed to give up in exchange. Promises, on the other hand,
could not be enforceable as a breech of promise does not imply theft.
Contracts in nonexchangeabie goods such os one's liberty could be
entered into but not enforced. One's freedom, unlike the title to car or plot
of land, cannot be exchanged. Liberty is inalienabie.2*
According to this property rights theory, animals have no rights. They
are merely te ch n ica l problems. One c a n n o t reason with a lion or
co ckroa ch a b o u t property r i g h t s . 2 7 | ca nn ot argue with a cockroach
about trespassing or aggressing against my property. But I can do anything
within my power to prevent the creatures from entering my property or

25Mises writes: "Production is not an a c t of creation; it does not bring about
something that did not exist before. It is a transformation given elements
through arrangem ent and com bination. The producer is not a creator.
Man is creative only in thinking and in the realm of imagination, in the world
of external phenomena he is only a transformer (Human Action, p. 140)."
2*One could enter into a slave contract but this could never be enforced,
i.e., the "slave" could not be forced to work. But if the "slave" stopped
working he wouid be liable for the funds of work yet undone. Further, the
"slave owner" could stipulate in the contract that should the "slave" refuse
to be a slave, the right to a certain sum of money wouid be relinquished.
(Rothbard, Tfie Ethics o f Liberty, pp. 133-148).
27The rights derived from argumentation ethics wouid apply to all individuals
regardless whether a specific individual has the ca p a city to argue. For
example, handicapped individuals would have the same rights. Similarly,
one who lost his ability to argue through disease or a ccide nt wouid stiii
have the sam,e rights as all others.
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exterminate ttie ones aiready on my property, so iong os my actions are in
accord witti ttie nonaggression axiom,28
Governments, by virtue of ttieir existence, violate the principles of
homesteading, production and voluntary exchange, No one gives money
to the state v o l u n t a r i l y , 29 As a result, the state must obtain property through
coercion or threat of coercion. The most com m on form is t a x a t i o n . ^ o
in addition, states exercise invasive control over individuals and their
property by invoking the principle of verbal declaration through autistic,
binary and triangular i n t e r v e n t i o n . 8 ' '®2 Examples include taxes, licenses,
280n animal rights, Biock states: "Alternatively, if animals are to have rights,
they must at least show that they respect the rights of human beings. That
is, if the lion claims the right not to be hunted by us, then, we must both get
up unharmed when the human and the lion lay down together. Why should
we do more for the lion (or the bear or others beloved by the animal 'rights'
organizations) than it is willing to d o for us? ("Environmental Problems,
Private Property Rights Solutions," p. 307.) Perhaps human sensitivity training
is in order. In addition, if one argues th a t ail living beings are to have rights
this would have to extend not only to animals but also to bacteria and
viruses. To be iogicaiiy consistent, anim al rights activists wouid hove to
refrain from using antibiotics, deodorant and other "anti-iife" products.
290ne exception is the purchasing of governm ent debt. But only this side of
the transaction is voluntary. The d ebt must be repaid with funds obtained
through taxation or another form of expropriation.
80|f you don't think taxation is involuntary, try not paying taxes.
81 On the typ o lo g y of intervention, Rothbard writes: "What typ e o f
intervention can the invader commit? Broadly, we m ay distinguish three
categories, in the first place, the intervener m ay com m and an individual
subject to do or not to do certain things when these actions directly involve
the individual person or property alone. In short, he restricts the subject's
use of his property when exchange is not involved. This m ay be called an
autistic intervention, for any specific com m and directly involves only the
subject himself. Secondly, the intervener m ay enforce a c o e rc e d
exchange betw een the individual subject and himself, or a coerced "gift"
to himself from the subject. Thirdly, the invader m ay either com pel or
prohibit an exchange betw een a pair of subjects. The former m ay be
coiled a binary intervention, since a hegem onic relation is established
betw een tw o people (the intervener and the subject); the latter may be
called a triangular intervention, since a hegem onic relation is cre ate d
betw een the invader and a pair of exchangers or would-be exchangers.
The market, com plex though it m ay be, consists of a series of exchanges
betw een pairs of individuals. However extensive the interventions, then,
they may be resolved into unit impacts on either individual subjects or pair
of individual subjects. "(Power a n d Market, p. 11)
82AII governments must be ouf/aw governments by definition. They cannot
function without violating their own legal rules. Citizens are prohibited from
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patents, conscription, regulations, welfare, eminent domain and monopoly
grants. Gun control, zoning, antitrust, labor and drug laws also fall under this
typology.

using coercion against others unless in self-defense, yet governm ent uses
non-defensive coercion everyday against individuals that operate within
the parameters of the nonaggression axiom. These delimitations can only
be viewed as invasions.
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CHAPTER

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE

P erfect C o m p e titio n

P erfect c o m p e titio n is the id e a l state of co m p e titio n th a t
g o ve rn m e n t policy attem pts to achieve. Under this m odel m arket
conditions th a t fail short of p e rfe c t co m p e titio n ideals re flect a
shortcoming of the market rather than the m odel and call for government
intervention.
Under p e rfe c t com petition, there exists p e rfe c t inform ation,
homogeneous products, no advertising and enough sellers such that no
single seller is large enough to exercise "monopoly power:" the ability to
achieve a higher total revenue by taking advantage of demand inelasticity
by restricting production and raising price.
Entrepreneurs in the perfect com petition m odel set production at
the point where m arginal cost equals price. Moreover, every producer
faces a perfectly horizontal demand curve, thus making a monopoly price
unattainable.
But what we experience in reality is much different from the perfectly
com petitive model. The law of decreasing marginal utility dictates that
every producer faces a downward sloping d em and curve. The dem and
curve for the individual firm under perfect com petition defies logic. A flat,
perfectly elastic, dem and curve would m ean th a t if the firm lowered its
price by one cent no product wouid be sold. Moreover, it is impossibie to
a ggregate the flat curves of perfectly-com petitive individual firms and
arrive at a downward-sloping curve for the industry. For this to occur would
imply that the curves are not perfectly elastic, but slope downward.
In a d d itio n , products are d iffere ntia ted , no one has p e rfe c t
information, firms advertise and every seller has some control over price.

18
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Several elastic and inelastic stretcties exist ttiroughout the p roducer’s
dem and curve. Entrepreneurs set production quantities a t the most
remunerative ievel, given their perceived dem and curve. The curve can
never be known with absolute certainty, and can change from one point in
time to another.
This uncertainty limits the a ccu ra cy of these production forecasts,
and, with this in mind, the entrepreneur sets a price for the product such
that the range of dem and above the price is elastic; any increase in price
would lead to a lower net revenue.
If the entrepreneur discovers he can increase his revenue by
producing less and raising prices, then he is guilty of charging a m onopoly
price.
But this situation is not as c le a r-c u t as it m ay seem.
It is
indistinguishable from one in which the dem and for the product has
increased, making the original price subcompetitive. The higher price,
then, is not a m onopoly price, but merely the new com petitive price.
Moreover, it c a n n o t be said this restriction is harmful to consumers
because, by definition, it must be met by a oorresponding expansion, either
into the production of other goods or the production of leisure, which is
also a good. Thus, the only prices that can arise on the free market are
free-market p r i c e s . 3 3
Consumers exert a great deal of pressure over free-market prices.
Any elastic or inelastic stretch along a product's dem and curve is entirely
due to the voluntary demands of consumers. If consumers feel a price is
too high, they need only reduce their dem and for the product and the
price will be forced to drop or the producer will be left with a surplus.3^
Moreover, why wouid producers hove incentive to produce at the
point where m arginal cost equals price? It makes little sense th a t a
producer would w ant to produce a good at 15 cents, for example, and
turn around and sell it for 15 cenfs. Production would oocur at the point
where marginal cost is iess than price, not equal to p r i c e . 3 5
33Hoppe, "From th e Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics o f
Libertarianism," p. 57.
34Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, p. 564.
35There is a n o th er restriction.
M ainstream economists assert th a t
entrepreneurs will try to get the last penny out of an investment. But in
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Neither does the efficient functioning of the market require perfect
or full knowledge. Mainstream economists assert that because man does
not have fuli market knowledge, the outcomes of market interactions are
flaw ed and require state intervention, Not so. Humans are im perfect,
accordingly, their knowledge and actions fall prey to their weaknesses. But
this so-called "failing" plagues not only the market. It plagues all institutions
that man has a hand in, even government.
Humans have different aptitudes, skills and levels of knowledge. Far
from hindering the proper functioning of the market, human differentiation
is an asset, it provides a role for the entrepreneur. Perhaps this is why man's
lack of fuli knowledge bothers the mainstream economist. The actions of
entrepreneurs oannot be m apped or forecast with m athem atical formulas.
Entrepreneurs are unpredictable. The entrepreneur uses the knowledge of
his products and potential customers to forecast which goods will be
valued higher in the im m ediate or near future. Those entrepreneurs that
are better able to forecast future demands will outperform those less apt.
Inform ation need not be evenly spread a m o n g all m arket
participants. Take the labor market, for example. Suppose only employers
know their employees discounted m arginal value product (DMVP) and
employees do not. An example: Joe Public is hired by a firm to perform a
jo b where his DMVP is equal to $10 an hour. The firm, realizing th a t Joe
Public has no idea of his DMVP, pays him only $4 an hour. A n o th e r
employer noticing the $6 differential entices Joe to work from him a t $4.50
an hour, all the while not telling Joe of his true DMVP. Another employer
realizing the differential is m oved to hire Joe for $4.75. This process ends
when Joe receives his DMVP or close enough to it that no entrepreneur
has an incentive to lure him from his present empioyer.36

reality this is far from true. What the entrepreneur seeks is a maximum rate
of return on his principal. Therefore, if the extra income that his increased
production nets him is less than he could get in other markets, e.g., the
money market, there is little incentive for him to increase his production.
36Biock, "Public finance texts cannot justify government taxation, " pp. 234235.
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Monopolies, Cartels and Mergers
M ainstream econom ists co n te n d free-m arket m onopolies are
deficient because of allocative and technical inefficiency. With monopoly
power, consumers pay more than the marginal cost of products, and firms
have no incentive to produce to the point where price equals marginal
cost. Mainstream economists also co nten d th at these firms have no
incentive to be efficient because of a lack of direct-seller rivolry.^^
In the m atter of one-firm monopolies, and all firms in general, it must
be realized that there is no objective m ethod for determining optim al firm
size. The size of the firm is a m atter for the entrepreneur and not th e
econom ist to decide. Suffice to say that firm size and m arket share are
reflections of overall efficienoy rather than monopoly power.^s
If it should happen that one firm dominates a market to the exclusion
of all others, the situation con only be the result of the voluntary demands
of consumers. If the firm is earning econom ic profits - a return above the
interest rate - then over tim e entrepreneurs will m ove from lowerremunerative industries to this higher-remunerative one. AN this will tend
toward the equalization of profit rates among all industries.
Moreover, th e firm's dom ination is entirely subordinate to the
dem ands of consumers. If people feel the firm's products or services are
ina d e q u a te or over-prioed, then they are free to patronize other firms or
go into direct com petition themselves with the dominant firm.
Cartels, like one-firm monopolies, fa ce similar scrutiny. There is little
difference, however, betw een the original formation of a corporation and
a cartel or merger (if a merger comprises the firms of an entire industry,
then it is similar to the formation of a permanent cartel).3?
All cartels, corporations and mergers pool assets into a com m on lot
to increase monetary return. The direction of this lot is put under the oontrol
of a oentrol organization. Initially, the only difference am ong the three is

37Armentano, Antitrust Policy: The Case for R epeal, p. 18.
38Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, p. 576.
39|bid., p. 573.
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that the asset pool of a corporation consists of m onetary assets while the
asset pool of cartels and mergers consists of capital-goods assets. Yet
cartels have one serious disadvantage over corporations: They are
inherently less stable because they fa c e both internal and external
pressure, while corporations face only external pressure, The least efficient
firms in the cartel arrangement benefit at the cost of the more efficient
through the preservation of market s h a r e s . ^ o
In the absence of cartelization, the more e fficien t firms w o u ld
increase production and gain in market share at the expense of the iess
efficient. An incentive is given to the more efficient firms to engage in
under-the-table com petition, particularly through the use of rebates, a
form of internal pressure. So long as the cartel is voluntary, the threat of
external pressure is ubiquitous.
Horizontal mergers and joint ventures are aliowed if they pass the
"rule of reason." Whether social benefits (cost savings in production and
distribution, as well as in financing, industrial research a n d p rod u ct
developm ent) outweigh social costs (the possible restriction of output) is
d e p e n de n t upon whether the merger or joint venture will create market
pow er, which is determ ined by relevant m arket and m arket share
analysis.41
Even if one were to assume th a t m onopoly power could produ ce
any deleterious effects on the free market, relevant m arket and market
share analyses are particularly unscientific and arbitrary. Relevant markets
are difficult to define. What ore the "reasonable substitutes" for soft drinks:
co ffe e , tea, fruit juice, beer, milk? W hat should the g e o g ra p h ic a l
boundaries of these markets be? Regional, national, i n t e r n a t i o n a l ? ^ ^
One m ethod used to determ ine relevant markets is cross-price
elasticities. It is impossible to determ ine whether the m otivating factor
behind change in dem and for one product was realiy the change in the
price of another. Furthermore, these figures are merely historical da ta and
can change from one moment to another.
Market share is also used to determine whether monopoly power will
be created but these determinations are m ade without the support of any
40|bid., pp. 572-3.
^lArmentano, Antitrust Policy, p. 55.
42|bid., pp. 57-8.
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rational econonnic theories. Who is to know whether m onopoly power for
a specific firm begins a t 34% or 34.8%?43
Almost any pricing practice can com e under the scrutiny of antitrust
authorities. High prices are called monopolistic. Firms that charge simiiar
prices can be accused of collusion. Low prices are signs of cu tthroat
com petition or "prioe discrimination." All are seen as ways of a tta in in g
m onopoly prices.
More often that not, firms th a t charge low prices are accused of
trying to gain in market share through the financiai destruction o f their
competitors. Why should an inefficient firm be aliowed to m aintain its
m arket share if it ca n n o t serve th e consumers as e fficien tly as its
competitors? Consumers con easily chastise firms by refusing to patronize
them. By patronizing the cutthroat com petitors they are demonstrating
that they see nothing wrong with the current state of affairs. Moreover, the
bonanza of bargain prices can hardly be seen as injurious to consumer
welfare.
An argument can be m ade that once the firm manages to wipe out
ali of its competitors, it will resort to m onopoly prices. This is dependent,
however, upon tw o factors: (1) that all firms in the industry are driven out of
the market and (2) that the product's dem and curve is such that it permits
the m onopoly firm to attain a m onopoly price. Even if these criteria are
met, it is still unlikely that the m onopoly firm will receive such a price, for
reasons already m entioned.'^
Often, the winner of a price war will not be the larger firm because
smaller firms, usually unburdened by large investments, are more effective
at cutting costs. Even if all firms are driven out of the industry there is no
way, short of governm ent intervention, of prohibiting new firms fro m
entering and com peting for the monopoly profits.46
Moreover, a smaller firm can shut down until a m onopoly price is
obtained, then reopen. Even if the smailer firm shouid becom e bankrupt,
new entrepreneurs can always purchase the existing plant at bargain
prices, giving the new entrepreneur a particularly powerful a d va n ta g e .
^3|bid., pp. 58-9.
^Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, pp. 601-2.
45|bid. p. 602.
^Ibid.
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Thus, if a m onopoly firm wishes to retain its newly attained market share, it
must keep prices low otherwise i t will invite new c o m p e t i t i o n ^ ^
Rather than identifying a m onopoly as a single-firm industry or one
that has monopoly power, the definition should be restricted to those coses
where free entry is prohibited by government privilege.

P a re to S uperiority

An action is Pareto superior if no one's condition can be improved
without worsening the condition of another. As it stands, Pareto optimality
endorses the status quo as the im plicit ideal, for "the goodness of free
contracts or unanimously approved changes from the existing situation
depends com pletely on the goodness or justice of the existing situation
/fse/f."^8 If a current regime is invasive, the criterion only freezes this injustice.
For example, to remove a price control would worsen the situation of the
beneficiaries of that control, thus failing the Pareto optimality criterion. Any
a tte m p t to repeal invasive laws and regulations would com e to a grinding

holt.49
W hat is missing from the criterion is a starting point from which to
begin our analysis. When the institutions of homesteading, production and
voluntary e xchange are affirm ed, every action resulting from these
principles would be Pareto superior by definition.
Boodway and Wildasin write "[T]he efficienoy of the allocation of
resources is to be judged ultimately by the Pareto principle with reference
to the preferences of ail individuals in society rather than using th e
preferences of some independent organic entity called 'the S t a t e . '"^o Yet
their call for state coercion belies their adherence to the Pareto principle.
No government action can be Pareto superior. The coercive nature
of governm ent actions must violate the voluntary preferences of society.
Otherwise, no coercion would be required.

47lbid., pp. 602-3.
‘'^SRothbard, Ethics o f Liberty, p. 203.
49|bid., pp. 203-205.
—Boadway and Wildasin, Pubiic Sector Economics, p. 56.
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The Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle fails as an attem pt to shore
up the weaknesses of the non-Austrian version of the Pareto principle.
Under this principle, economists can pronounce that an action increases
social welfare if the winners can (but don't have to) compensate the losers
and still remain winners.
A ctual, not potential. Increases are w ha t is im portant to the
economist. Only when the actual losers are com pensated can we then
discover whether they are no longer losers. Since the winners c a n n o t
examine the utility scales of the losers they must rely on the losers word for
the proper amount of compensation.
But w hat happens if one or m ore individuals assert th a t no
remuneration, m onetary or otherwise, can elevate them from their loser
status? The existence of one lone intransigent anarchist could halt all
government actions.
The problem with the compensation principle is that is impossible to
tell w hat has happened to anyone's utility. Only if the individuals under
consideration actually had the choice between tw o alternatives could any
welfare pronouncem ent be made. If an actor choose alternative A over
alternative B, we would know that the actor believed he would benefit ex
ante. As Rothbard notes since "the a c t of compensation is, necessarily, a
unilateral gift to a person rather than an a ct o f th a t person. ..it is impossible
to estimate how much his utility has increased as com pared to its decrease
in some other situation.

E fficiency

The efficiency criterion is often em ployed to justify governm ent
intervention. But efficiency is only operative in relation to specified ends.
The question is, whose ends ore to be followed? Public policy decisions are
based on the utilitarian belief that ail ends are really the same: Everyone
seeks a higher standard of living. This com m on end is supposed to lend
credibility to the scientific nature of these decisions.
51Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction o f Utiiity and Weifare Economics, pp.
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The definition of w hat constitutes a higher standard of living is
subjective. Some may desire more governm ent programs, others iess and
some none. Some prefer population reductions, others increases.
want clean air, some couldn't care less. The list is endless.

Some

Therefore, if ends conflict there is no scientific m ethod of determining
w hat is or isn't efficient. No additive co n ce p t am ong conflicting ends is
possible. Any c o n ce p t is necessarily arbitrary and non-scientific. Rothbard
illustrates th a t even when reduced to the individual, efficiency is non
operative.
Let us take a given individual. Since his own ends are clearly
given and he acts to pursue them, surely at least f?/s actions
can be considered efficient? But no, they may not, for in order
for him to a c t efficiently, he would hove to possess perfect
k n o w le d g e -p e rfe c t knowledge of the best technology, of
future actions and reactions by other people, and of future
natural events. But since no one ca n ever have perfect
know ledge of the future, no one's action can be called
"efficient." We live in a world of uncertainty. Efficiency is
therefore a chimera.sz
Acting is always a learning process. Individuals constantly evaluate
and reevaluate their values and goals. An actor's knowledge of how to
pursue his ends co n always improve but can never be truly "efficient"
because he lacks omniscience.
This view of efficiency explains why some firms, newspapers for
example, remain in business even though they frequently lose money. If the
owner's end is not monetary but ideological, then the newspaper may well
lose m oney year after year, yet still remain efficient from the viewpoint of
the owner.53
Efficient solutions minimize social costs. But why should social costs
be minimized? And a t w hat price should social costs be minimized?
Economics tells us such costs exist. But it does not follow from purely
e co n o m ic statements th a t they should be reduced. The word "should"
inserts an ethical decision into the analysis.

52Rothbard, "Comment: The Myth of Efficiency," p. 90.
53This situation is primarily limited to privately-held firms as the investors of
pubiiciy-owned firm,s usually have monetary ends.
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Moreover, Austrions insist that it is ridiculous to talk of reducing costs
since all costs ore necessarily subjective and non-quantifiable, How con
something th a t ca n n o t be measured be reduced? Efficiency analysis
should be abandoned in favor of ethical principles as they provide a much
stronger foundation for public policy d e c i s i o n s . 5 4

In d iffe re n c e C urves

Central to modern non-Austrian economio analysis is the indifference
curve. These curves have uses ranging from determining Pareto efficient
outcomes to finding optimal taxes.
Indifference curves are drawn on two- or three-dimensional graphs.
Either dimension represents one good or a bundle of goods. A curve that
represents an individual's preferences is smooth and convex with respect
to the origin. The actor is indifferent between any two or more points along
the curve.
The point of ta n g e ncy betw een the indifference curve and the
budget line determines the allocation that will be chosen. Budget lines are
determined by the price of each good in relation to the actor's income.
The points along the line are arrived at through observing an actor's
preferences. But this is futile. No one can tell w hat choices an individual will
make until he acts. There is no substitute for actual human action.
A truly indifferent a cto r will not aot. The m om ent he acts,
indifference is thrown by the wayside and preference is shown, thus
proving he was not, in fa ct, indifferent. Indifference ca n n o t be proven
through action.
A greater problem lies in the use of indifference curves for policy
decisions. Assuming these curves have some validity, to argue that they
have validity other than at the point the actual preferences are m apped is
tenuous. An actor may choose to rank A above B and B above C at one
point in time. But this ranking can change from moment to moment.
Here c o n sta n cy is confused with consistency.
An a c to r's
preferences must be ordinal such that A is preferred to B and B to C. With
54Rothbard, "Comment: The Myth of Efficiency," pp. 90-95.
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this ranking, the a cto r will choose A. This ranking is go od only a t the
m oment the actors chooses A. To assume that the actor will in the future
have the same rankings implies constancy. So long as an individual can
learn or change his mind there is no reason to assume this.
The use of smooth lines also lends itself to difficulties. An actor is
supposedly indifferent between any com bination of goods along the line.
Any movement along the line, no matter how infinitesimally small, is possible.
Therefore a basket of goods containing 5.565656 liters of beer and .30025
bratwursts is theoreticaily possible. But humans don't a c t on infinitesimally
small quantities if they are incapable of discerning them. They a c t on
discrete quantities.
Taking this into consideration, the indifference curve is no longer a
curve, but a set of points or stretches. There is no ta n g e ncy point and
consequently no use for the diagram.
As a theoretical foundation, indifference curves are wrought with
logical error, Any analysis utilizing them is questionable.ss

Utility a n d S o cia l W e lfa re Functions

Utility and social welfare functions can justify actions of the state on
the grounds that they reflect welfare gains. In describing the workings of
the social welfare function, Boadway and Wildasin write; "This illustration [an
example on a previous page] is only conceptual in the sense that the social
welfare function is not known, and ca n n o t be known on the basis of
econom ic reasoning a l o n e . "56 Despite their misgivings, they proceed with
the function in their discussion of taxation.
Utility and sociai w elfare functions c a n n o t pass the rigor of
praxeology. The use of functions in economics has been wrongly imported
from physics. Unlike the behavior of atoms, human action ca nn ot be
summarized by m athem atical functions. Human behavior is purposeful and
can ch a n g e from m om ent to m om ent with changes in knowledge and
preferences. There is no reason to believe th a t the preferences upon
55Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction, pp, 13-15.
56Boadwoy and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 32.
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which these functions are m odeled will hold for any periods of time other
than those a t which the actions took piace.57 There are no constant
relations in the sciences of human action.
The survival of ordinal utility functions is understandable, but the
a d h erence to cardinal utility functions is inexcusable. Boadway and
Wildasin assert that "[cjardinai measurability is familiar as being the way in
whioh tem perature, height, weight, etc. are m e a s u r e d . "58 Not so.
Temperature, height and weight are all quantities extensive in space. Their
units of measurement are also extensive in space so th at everyone can
agree to the size of the unit used.
But utility is different precisely because it is intensive rather than
extensive in space. No one can see u t i l i t y . 5 9 No scale or ruler of utility
exists. Even if one did exist it would fail because everyone would p la ce
different values on the unit of measurement in question.
Giving utility and social welfare functions more than short schrift
bespeaks the forlorn state of economics. The farther one wanders from
the axiom of action, the closer one borders the frontiers of cra ckpo t
economics.

57Qn this. Mises writes; "The attem pt has been m ade to attain the notion of
nonrational action by this reason; If ois preferred to b and b to c, logically a
should be preferred to c. But if actually c is preferred to o, we are fa ce d
with a m ode of actin g to which we ca nn o t ascribe consistency a n d
rationality. This reasoning disregards the fa ct that tw o acts of an individual
can never by synchronous. If in one action a is preferred to b and in
another action b to c, it is, however short the interval betw een the two
actions m ay be, not permissible to construct a uniform scale of value in
which a precedes b and b precedes c. Nor is is permissible to consider a
later third action as coincident with the two previous actions. All that the
exam ple proves is that value judgments are not im m utable and that
therefore a scale of value, which is abstracted from various, necessarily
nonsynchronous actions of an individual, m ay be se lf-contradictory."
(Human Action, p. 103.)
58Boadway and Wildasin, Pubiic Sector Economics, p. 272.
59Some m ay o b je c t th a t neither can tem perature be seen. On the
contrary, tem perature is measured by the effects it has on mercury. A
higher level of mercury on the thermometer denotes a higher temperature
and vice-versa (Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction, pp. 18-19).
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C onsum ers' a n d P roducers' Surplus a n d D e a d w e ig h t Loss

The co n ce p ts of consunners' and producers' surpluses e n ab le
economists to determ ine d e a d w e ig h t losses resulting from governm ent
policies. Consumers' surplus is the difference betw een the price buyers
pay for a good and the maximum price they would have paid. Producers'
surplus is the difference betw een the price sellers receive for a good and
the minimum am ount for which they would have sold it. A deadw eight loss
is the dollar value of the loss in utiiity due to monopoly.
An assumption behind this analysis is "prices ca n be interpreted as
m onetary measures o f m arginai benefits o f goods to househoids a n d o f
tiie m arginal costs o f production...[J]h\s is because househoids a llo ca te
their incom e am ong the purchase of various goods in such a way that the
marginai value in m onetary terms equals the price for each g oo d."^
This assumption fails on tw o counts. First, prices ca n n o t m easure
marginal benefits. Second, there is never an equalization of v a l u e s . ^ i
Exchange occurs b e ca u se b oth actors h ave reverse p r e fe r e n c e
orderings: Each actor values the good he is to receive more than the good
he gives up.
Another incorrect assumption underlying this c o n c e p t is th a t the
value of a dollar to each household is the s a m e . 52 Again, how could the
e conom ist d e te rm in e w h eth er this was th e case?

This requires

ôOBoadway and Wildasin, Pubiic Sector Economics, p. 34. Emphasis added.
51Rothbard, Man Economy and State, p. 260.
52What follows is an exam ple of how ludicrous this notion ca n becom e.
Samuelson writes: "How is the c o n c e p t of consumer's surplus used? It is
sometimes needed to help make correct social decisions. Suppose a new
branch road w ould cost your tow n $100,000. Being free to all, it is
expected to bring in no dollar revenues, and all the utility it give to eaoh
user will represent his consumer's surplus.
(To a v o id extraneous
interpersonal difficulties, let us assume there are 1,000 users ail exactly alike
in incom e a n d in their b e n efit from the road, a n d ail equally worthy.) If
each such similar man enjoys $100 (the road's per cap ita cost) or more of
consumer's surplus form the road, they should all vote to build the rood. If
the consumer's surplus of each is less than $ 100, it is uneconom ical for them
to tax themselves for this pubiic project." (Economics [1976], p. 439.)
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interpersonal utility comparisons, Ttie subjectivity of utility, as has been
illustrated, prevents this.
Every individual places a different value on a dollar and the value
changes in relation to one's supply of m o n e y . 6 3 in addition, the value
placed on a dollar can change from one m oment in time to another. It is
impossible to know the value individuals attach to these surpluses because
subjective values cannot be aggregated.
Deadweight loss fails as an attem pt to measure the dollar am ount of
the loss in utility due to m o n o p o l y . 6 4 This would imply the ability to
interpersonally examine utility levels. From the viewpoint of praxeology, all
nonaggressive actions on the free market result in non-quantifiable utility
surpluses while all government actions involve utility losses.

63This does not justify any judgments regarding the value of a dollar to a
millionaire in comparison to that of a bum. Any such decision would imply
interpersonal utility comparisons.
64Block, "Public finance texts cannot justify government taxation," p. 231.
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CHAPTER IV

THE THEORIES OF PUBLIC FINANCE

The S tate

The state is of particular im portance to the public finance economist,
because without it he could not implement his theories, Since Musgrave is
perhaps the most popular am ong the public finance economists and his
books the most widely used, his texts will serve as an outline for criticism. He
lists some of the reasons for the necessity of the coercive sector:
1. The claim th a t the m arket mechanism leads to efficient
resource use (i.e, produces w hat consumers w ant most and
does so in the cheapest way) is based on the condition of
com petitive factor and product markets. This means that there
must be no obstacles to free entry and that consumers must
have full market knowledge. Government regulation or other
measures are needed to secure these conditions.
2. They are needed also where, due to decreasing cost,
competition is inefficient.
3. More generally, th e c o n tra c tu a l arrangem ents and
exchanges needed for market operation cannot exist without
th e prote ctio n a n d e n fo rce m e n t of a g o v e rn m e n ta lly
provided legal structure.
4. Even if the legal structure were provided, and all barriers to
com petition were removed, the production or consumption
characteristics of certain goods are such th at these goods
c a n n o t be provided for through the market. Problems of
"externalities" arise whioh lead to "market failure" and require
solution through the public sector.
5. Social values m ay require adjustments in the distribution of
incom e and wealth whioh results from the market system and
from the transmission of property rights through inheritance.
6. The market system, especially in a highly developed financial
econom y, does not neoessarily bring high employment, price

32
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level stability, and the socially desired rate of econom ic
growth, Public policy is needed to secure these objectives
7. Public and private points of view on the rate of discount
used in valuation of future (relative to present) consumption
may differ,*5

Before one discusses the proper role, if any, of the state, it is first
necessary to define the state. Public fina nce economists hove similar
definitions of the state, but all differ radically from that held by Austrians.
The 19th century German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer sums the Austrian
position when he writes: "There are tw o fundam entally opposed means
whereby man, requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary
means for satisfying his desires. These are work and robbery, one's own
labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of others...I propose in the
following discussion to call one's own labor...the 'econom ic means'...while
the unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the
'political means.'"66
This is in stark contrast to Due and Friedlaender who write: "society
organizes collectively through government for tw o purposes: to ensure that
the market-determined allocation of goods and services is efficient and to
enable society to reach its preferred point on the utility possibility frontier. "67
It is difficult to imagine how a governm ent based on coercion could bring
any society to its preferred point on the utility possibility frontier. Every
governm ent action, by definition, must bring about a loss in utility. One
wonders how rulers justified their existence before the advent of the
modern economist.
That the state is a criminal organization, a creator of monopolies and
a parasite, does not enter their analyses. Rothbard's analysis cuts through
the smoke and mirrors:
The State m ay therefore be defined as the organization which
possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of
the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue b y
physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory
m onopoly o f foroe a nd of ultim ate decision-making power
65Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory a nd Practice, pp. 5-6.
66Qppenheimer, The Sfafe, p. 12.
67Due and Friedlaender, Government Finance, p. 120
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over a given territorial area. Botti of these essential activities
of the State necessarily constitute criminal aggression a n d
depredation of the just rights of private property of Its subjects
(including self-ownership).
For the first constitutes and
establishes theft on a grand scale; while the second prohibits
the free co m p e titio n of defense a n d decision-m aking
agencies within a given territorial a re a -p ro h ib itin g the
voluntary purchase and sale of defense and judicial services,*^
Shoup's analysis blurs the distinction between the state, church and
family when he writes: "The government's system operates with the aid of a
legal power of compulsion. But in many countries one or more members of
a family or of a religious or charitable organization have possessed or still
do possess legal power of compulsion over other members. The chief
difference betw een the government's allocating system and that of the
fam ily, church, or other nonprofit institution lies in the degre e of
impersonality of the rules under which the governm ent distributes its
services and allocates the burden of covering the costs."69 On the same
p a g e he continues: "In its use of impersonal rules the governm ent
resembles the market more than it does the family or nonprofit institution."
It seems Shoup is attem pting to gloss over the use of non-defensive
coercion, a true differenoe betw een the market and the state. Charities
do not resort to coercion if their benefactors or prospective benefactors
refuse to co n trib u te b e ca u se th e y are vo luntary organizations.
Government isn't. No one goes to jail for not supporting a charity. It is true
th a t families do exert a degree of coercion over their offspring but this
c a n n o t be said a b o u t adults.70 They are free to do as they will. The
authority of the family ends when one becom es an adult. The authority of
governm ent never ends.
Boadway and Wildasin hold the "we are the government" view of the
state. They write: "The state is viewed as the sum total of the individuals in
society rather than as being an entity unto itself with its own goals and
desires. As a consequence, the criterion by which we judge governm ent
decision-making is the same as th at by which we judge market decision68Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 171.
69Shoup, Pubiic Finance, p. 4.
7°This coercion can be a vo id e d by running aw ay or b eco m in g an
em ancioated minor.
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making; that is, by how well it accords with the preferences of individuals in
sooiety."7i But we are not the state,72 The state consists of a minority of
individuals and their decisions reflect only fhe/T preferences.
Furthermore, all governm ent decisions rest on coercion. Coercive
actions are seldom in a cco rd with the voluntary preferences of individuals
outside the state. If they were, no coercion would be required. By their
criterion, a ll state decision-m aking must fall short of free-m arket
alternatives.
Public fin a n ce theories of the state are naive and inadequate.
Rothbard's view, which incorporates Oppenheimer's anaiysis, is a much
more a ccu ra te description of the nature and operation of the state and is
the one that will be used throughout this paper.

C o s t-B e n e fit Analysis

C ost-benefit analysis (CBA) is another tool of the publio finance
economist. Those projects th a t yield benefits greater than costs are
considered e fficient and therefore suitable for the undertaking. CBA
usually involves the ranking of alternative projects.
Hyman summarizes the process of CBA as follows:
1. Enumerate all costs and benefits of the proposed project.
2. Evaluate all costs and benefits in dollar terms.
3. Discount future b e n e fits ...73
The subjectivity of costs and benefits stands in the way of successfully
co m p le tin g step 1. Some benefits m ay seem easy to enumerate. For
example, a new transit system provides an additional and perhaps more
convenient m ethod of transport. But whether this is a benefit depends
upon the valuations of the taxpayers. Again, since taxation is used to
finance state projects, the question of whether one can be said to benefit
from co e rce d actions com plicates the matter. Absent voluntary choice.
71Boadway and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 56.
72According to this view, every action of the state, no m atter how evil, is
the will of the everyone, even the victims.
73Hyman, Public Finance, p. 301.
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an econom ist cannot determ ine w hettier a proposed project provides
benefits to anyone. Further, even if ta xation were absent from the
equation, the economist would have to rely on voluntary contributions or
wait until the project was finished and then present the choice to the
individual. Until this occurred, an economist could make no scientific
pronouncem ent on the existence of benefits.
Similar problems exist for the pinpointing of costs. That same transit
system m ay require em inent dom ain or taxes for land acquisition and
construction. This seems like an obvious cost, but costs hove no meaning
apart from the individuals who realize them. What is the opportunity cost to
an individual of having his property confiscated? Or of having five dollars in
taxes extracted from him? A hot dog? A pencil? A co m p a ct disc? What
about nontangible subjective elements?
The same roadblock stands in the way of com pleting step 2. CBA is
pred ica te d on the assumption th a t "a dollar is judged to hove the same
value no m atter to whom it a c c r u e s . " ^ / ) This assumption is almost given no
consideration yet all c o st-b e n e fit conclusions spring from it.

It is a

m om entary suspension of logic. The value one places on anything is
subjective. The fa ct that value is intensive rather than extensive in space is
the biggest roadblock in the way of the economist who wishes to moke
such blanket statements.
One fault of this assumption lies in the neoclassical view that the
closer markets are to perfect com petition the closer m oney costs will
e q u a l o p p o rtu n ity costs.75 The p e rfe c t co m p e titio n p a ra d ig m is
unm itigated nonsense. Money cannot measure costs, neither can money
costs and opportunity costs be equalized. As has been illustrated, when
one engages in exchange, the money given up is valued less than the item
received. This is all we can glean from the a c t of exchange. Opportunity
costs are entirely subjective and cannot be known to any outside observer.
The ephem eral and subjective nature of these costs prevents them from
being aggregated in any meaningful scientific sense.
Step 3 also presents problems. Future benefits are discounted by the
social rate of discount. This is necessary because of the universal fa c t of
74Boadway and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 190.
75Formaini, The Myth o f Scientific Public Policy, p. 47.
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time preference: Future benefits cannot have the same value as those
some benefits in the present. But if CBA foils steps 1 and 2 is there any
reason to consider the discounting of future "benefits"?
Atkinson and Stiglitz see the problems of CBA in another light. They
write: "[T]he problem of cost-benefit analysis is simply whether we can find
reasonable short cuts. In particular, we are presum ed to have g o o d
information concerning direct costs a nd benefits of a project (its inputs and
outputs); the question is whether there is any simple way of relating the total
effects (the total changes in the vectors of consumption) to the direct
effects. (Italics a d d e d . )"76
This is an unreasonable presumption. These "direot costs and
benefits" are entirely subjective. All we know is th a t if an individual
exchanges a sum of money for a good then he values the good more than
the money he gives up. Nothing more.
The only m ethod of determining whether social benefits outweigh
social costs is through the voluntary interactions of the market. Sinoe all
acts of governm ent intervention o ccu r outside the social nexus o f
voluntary exchange, they must, by definition, be utility-reducing. Any
attem pt by economists to measure the benefioial effects of government is
futile and necessarily non-scientific.
Even if CBA was valid it would still not follow the project in question
should be undertaken. This requires a moral judgm ent derived outside the
field of economics.

76,Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Finance, p. 475.
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G o v e rn m e n t D e b t

Government d ebt finances deficits, transfer payments and projects.
Ttiis d ebt differs from private d ebt in that the funds used to repay the debt
are acquired by way of taxation or c o u n t e r f e i t i n g . 77 it also makes for a
more stable form of d e b t for investors because the state can never go
bankrupt. It can always print money or increase taxes to cover its debt
obligations.78
Not all economists agree on the effects government debt. Atkinson
and Stiglitz write: "Whether the existence of governm ent d e b t diverts
savings and leads to a reduction in real capital accumulation depends, for
example, on whether people take a long-term view of the liabilities of
succeeding generations and adjust bequest behavior."79
On th e contrary, praxeology tells us that government d e b t must
always lead to a reduction in real capital accumulation. The mere a ct of
governm ent spending reduces real ca p ita l accumulation because it is
pure consumption. The defining characteristic of investment is that the
capital is spent to satisfy the wishes of consumers. Government spending
satisfies the wishes of government agents. It is not investment.8°
Further, in a m onetary econom y investment is characterized by an
expenditure on interm ediate products to produce a good from which
revenue is expected to pay for the outlay and a return on the investment.
For most coercive sector investments, no revenue is ever collected. When

77Counterfeiting, as used throughout this paper, refers to the creation of
money out of thin air, Austrians m aintain th at money originated out of
barter as a commodity. Therefore, every exchange involved the giving up
of a com m odity for a good or service. Non-backed paper money is not a
market phenomenon. Rather, it is the result of state intervention. The state,
instead of mining for gold money, creates money out of thin air. Only the
state and private counterfeiters can obtain goods and services with
money created out of thin air. Everyone else must produce a good or
service in exchange for money. (See Menger, Principles of Economicsand
Rothbard, What Has Government Done to Our Money?)
78The option of printing money applies only to the central government.
79Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Finance, p. 257.
80Rothbard, Power and Market, p. 173.
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no revenue is oollected, the expenditure is pure consum ption, n o t
investment,81
The funds to repay state d e b t must co m e from savings or
counterfeiting. Repayment with private savings negatively impacts capitai
accum ulation. The a c t of saving, like all actions, has costs. These savings
are not p aid to th e state voluntarily bu t are expropriated by w ay of
taxation. This necessarily reduces the incom es of taxpayers. Time
preferences are negatively a ffe cte d as every tax or tax increase pushes
individuals closer to subsistence. Those nearer subsistence can no t save as
much, as present concerns (namely surviving) will tend to outweigh future
ones. A higher social time preference means lower savings and ca p ita l
accumulation, which in turn translate into a lower standard of living.
In ad d itio n , m an must not always work. Leisure is always an
alternative. As the cost of work increases through taxation, the relative
cost of leisure is reduced. Accordingly, more individuals will engage in
leisure instead of work, further reducing the supply of ca p ita l as the less
productive have less to save.
Repayment by counterfeiting results in inflation and the concom itant
systematic wealth redistribution from non-counterfeiters to counterfeiters
and the early receivers of the counterfeit money. This m ethod is chosen
less frequently than taxation as its effects are exacerbated by fractionalreserve banking. Under the current system, any counterfeit paper money
increases the money supply by ten times the amount of the paper inflation.
G overnm ent d e b t also crowds out private investment. The state's
dem and for funds increases the dem and for savings and must com pete
with private interests. This increases the interest rate above w hat it would
be without the state com peting for funds.
On the nature of government debt Hyman writes:
Debt financing implies the sale of a security that bears the
promise to pay interest over a given number of years and to
return the principal loaned at the end of the given time period.
There is no compulsion involved in the saies of such securities.
Instead governments co m p e te with other borrowers in the
81If a price is charged for the coercive sector product one must wonder
why the free market had not provided such a service. The answer is most
likely that the investment project was not viable.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
market for loanable funds. The governm ent pays the going
m arket rate of interest, adjusted for risk and m aturity
characteristics of the obligation it issues. Thus, the issuance of
government d e b t is similar to the sale of services that have the
regular characteristics of private goods. Governm ent sells
securities of various types...that com pete with various private
securities...82
The above leads one believe that the sale of government debt is no
different from the sale of private debt. Government de bt is debt in name
only, In actuality, it is an extortion contract. In e xch a n g e for the
purchaser's funds the state agrees to pay the principal and interest not with
its own resources, but with the resources of a non-contractual third party,
taxpayers. Were these bonds sold by a private person, he would be
quickly jailed. But since the state sets the ruies of the game, it naturally
exempts itself from prosecution.
Debt requires tw o parties, a debtor and a creditor. In the cose of
governm ent debt, the creditors are those individuals who seek a secure
investm ent a t the expense of others.88 And th e debtors ore those
politicians and bureaucrats who oversaw the issuance of that debt, Any
attem pt to co lle ct from individuals outside this group is tantam ount to
extortion,
The enforcing of governm ent obligations, like taxation, has profound
sociological effects, By doing so, it increases the costs of homesteading,
contracting and producing while reducing the costs of non-homesteading,
non-contracting and non-producing. Accordingly, more individuals will
tend to engage in the latter activities, whereas prior to their legalization
these invasive actions were primarily the domain of criminals.
Opinions differ on the nature of the burdens associated with state
debt. Due and Friedlaender adm it that government expenditures burden
voluntary sector output. They write: "The burden is, of course, more than
82|-iyman, Public Finance, p. 445.
88It can be argued th a t bondholders are also taxpayers. This much is true.
But we can also conclude th a t bondholders plan on receiving more than
the am ount they pay for governm ent d e b t otherwise there would be little
reason to purchase these bonds, unless of oourse it was to provide the
state with a gift. It must be remembered that not everyone is a bondholder
to the same extent, but everyone is a taxpayer. This situation implies
systematic redistribution.
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offset by the gains fronn the governm ental programs if the latter are
established on the basis of the preferences of the community, with a net
gain from the activity as a w h o l e . "84 This statement is difficult to justify if one
realizes th a t the power of all governments rest on coercion and coercive
actions seldom represent the preferences of those co e rce d . Since
coercion is involved in financing all governm ent programs, Pareto
superiority cannot be fulfilled as not all parties to the financing (namely the
coerced) con be said to benefit.
From the view point of praxeology, governm ent d ebt is a double
burden on the economy. First, resources are diverted from the productive
voluntary sector to the unproductive coercive sector. Second, the debt
incurred must be pa id out at some tim e in the future with taxes or
counterfeit m o n e y . 8 5
The proper role of the economist is not to a d v o c a te or defend
governm ent debt, but to point out the negative im pact of such debt. All
state d e b t is by its very nature a predation. The solution, usually only
reserved for third-world nations, is to repudiate all government debt.86
W hat of the fa te of governm ent bondholders? They will incur
entrepreneurial losses just as those in the voluntary sector who m ake
in correot forecasting judgm ents. There is no reason to give these
84Que and Friedlaender, Government Finance, p. 219.
85Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, p. 942(137).
86Debt repudiation is not an exclusively non-A m erican experience.
Rothbard writes; "Although largely forgotten by historians and the public,
repudiation of state d e b t is a solid part of the American tradition. The first
wave of repudiation of state debt cam e during the 1840's, after the panics
of 1837 and 1839. Those panics were the consequence of a massive
inflationary boom fueled by the Whig-run Seoond Bank of the United States.
Riding the wave of inflationary credit, numerous state governments, largely
those run by the Whigs floated an enormous am ount of debt, most of
which w ent into wasteful public works (euphemistically called 'internal
improvements'), and into the creation of inflationary banks...The next great
w ave of state d e b t repudiation cam e in the South after the blight of
Northern occupation and Reconstruction had been lifted from them. Eight
Southern states (Alabam a, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) proceeded, during the late 1870's
and early 1880's under Democratic regimes, to repudiate the debt foisted
upon their taxpayers by the corrupt and wasteful c a rp e tb a g Radical
Republican governments under Reconstruction." (Rothbard, "Repudiating
the National Debt," p.52.)
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bondholders any preferential treatnnent, especially since they wished
(either consciously or unconsciously) to m ake a safe "investment" at the
expense of others, if these bondholders wish to collect, the only individuals
who could possibly be responsible for redeem ing the bonds are the
politicians and bureaucrats that oversaw their issuance.
The repudiation of public debts is in a cco rd with private property
rights. This cannot be said with regard to private debts. On the difference
Rothbard writes:
If I borrow m oney from a m ortgage bank, I have m ade a
contract to transfer my money to a creditor at a future date; in
a deep sense, he is the true owner of the m oney a t that point,
and if I don't pay I am robbing him of his just property. But
when governm ent borrows money, it does not pledge its own
money; its own resources ore not liable. Government commits
not its own life, fortune, and sacred honor to repay the debt,
but ours. This is a horse, and a transaction, of a very different
coior.87
Repudiation will, no doubt, fa c e m uch resistance as m any in our
society have a vested interest in the smooth functioning of the predatory
state apparatus. One beneficial aspect of repudiation is no one will wont
to purchase governm ent bonds knowing full well that at some time in the
future they m ay be repudiated. This will make it particularly difficult for the
state to procure financing.

E c o n o m ic S ta b iliza tio n

Econom ic stabilization is a n o th e r ground for g o v e r n m e n t
intervention. Inflation, business cycles and unemployment, public finance
authors assert, require government intervention. Actually, they result from
intervention.
Inflation results from an increase in the dem and for, or a decrease in
the supply of, goods and services. Since the supply of goods and services
isn't shrinking, it must co m e from the dem and side.

But an Individual's

87Rothbard, "Repudiating the Nationai Debt," p. o2.
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increase in dem and for one good, ceteris paribus, must result in ttie
decrease in dem and for ottiers. Government counterfeiting is necessary
for overall prices to rise.
The counterfeit money can be channeled into the econom y either
through the credit system or transfer payments, As individuals receive the
new m oney, their d e m a n d for goods a n d services increases. The
recipients of this money repeat the sequence. Prices don't rise at the
same time and to the same extent throughout the econom y. Instead, a
multitude of rippling effects occur throughout the econom y depending
upon the locations and purchases of the recipients.
Inflation redistributes goods and services in favor of the early
recipients of the counterfeit m oney, e.g., politicians, bureaucrats,
governm ent contractors, as their purchases are m ade before the full
e ffe ct of the inflation is felt. Individuals on fixed incomes and those that
never see the new money are hit the hardest.
In addition, the real value of savings declines as all goods and
services now cost more. A dollar will no longer purchase w hat It once
could. This discourages savings because every dollar that remains unspent
will diminish in value from year to year under inflation. Inflation also creates
capital consumption, as some producers will not realize that their increased
profits are not profits at all, but merely Inflationary gains required to replace
their capital g o o d s . ^ s
Money flowing into the credit system produces all the above effects
in addition to creating a business cycle. As the money flows into the credit
markets, it lowers the interest rate. Investment projects previously
nonvioble at the higher interest rate, namely those in the higher orders of
production, ore now profitable at the lower interest rate.89,9o
The firms that receive the new money bid up the prices of labor and
land required for the projects in the higher orders. In turn, the employees of
these firms use the m oney to purchase goods and services a t their

®®See Rothbard, Wt)ot has Government Done to our Money?
®9The funds will also be lent for projects that are not in the higher orders, but
the major im pact is on the higher orders.
90|t may happen that interest doesn't seem to be lower than before. But so
long as the money is channeled into the credit system the rate will be lower
than what it would have been without the counterfeit credit.
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unchanged consumption-investment ratios. This creates upward pressure
on interest rates, as a reduction in the social rate of time preference has
not changed to reflect the lower tim e-preference required to maintain the
lower interest rate.
As time passes, factors are bid aw ay from the higher orders into the
lower orders reflecting the unchanged social time-preference. Firms in the
higher orders will find their resource prices rising above their initial forecasts
because of new com petition from firms in the lower orders. Unless the
governm ent pumps more m oney into the credit system, they will be forced
to liquidate.
The process will continue until the point is reached where the
g o vernm ent can no longer increase the supply of credit w ithout also
tacking on an inflation premium. When the flow of new fiduciary credit is
stopped, a bust (recession) will f o l l o w . ^ !

Full Employment
Full em ploym ent is an assumption underlying public finance analysis.
It exists when everyone willing to work a t the m arket rate for his type of
labor has a job. It excludes frictional employment. Under full em ploym ent
neither structural unemployment nor unemployment due to a deficiency in
aggregate dem and exists.
Without full em ploym ent it is alleged that orthodox theories do not
hold true. Therefore, the coercive sector must intervene to remedy any
deviation from full employment. Rothbard maintains the opposite:
[l]t should be emphasized th a t econom ic theory does not
"assume" full em ploym ent. Economics, in fact, "assumes"
nothing. The whole discussion of alleged "assumptions" reflects
the bias of the epistemology of physics, where "assumptions"
are m a de w ithout originally knowing their validity and ore
eventually tested to see whether or not their consequents are
correct. The econom ist does not "assume"; he k n o w s . Fie
concludes on the basis of logical deduction from self-evident

9''For a more com plete explanation, see Rothbard, America's Great
Depression.
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axioms, i.e., axioms th a t are either logically or em pirically
incontrovertible.92
Casting the full em ploym ent assum ption aside, th e re is no
em ploym ent problem in a free-market society. Everyone, os long os he is
willing to work, con find work. There is an infinite am ount of work to be
done. As long as their is scarcity, there will be work.
Mainstream economists give the impression that work, any work, is
w hat is important. If this were true, people would work for free or even pay
employers to let them w o r k . 9 3 w h a t Is sought by most is work at a w age
above subsistence level.
The price of labor, like every other good in the market, is determined
by supply and demand. The pricing system conspicuously falls out of full
employment analysis. This is the hallmark of crackpot economics.
A distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment must
be m ade. Voluntary unem ploym ent ca n o ccu r whenever a laborer
prefers to engage in leisure instead of em ploym ent. This is the choice of
the individual. It can also occur when an Individual Is holding out for a
w age that exceeds his discounted marginal value product (DMVP). For
example, he wants to receive $15 an hour, yet the market only values the
fruits of his labor at $5 an hour. A similar result occurs If on Individual is
holding out for a specific job but is not hired for the position.
Involuntary unem ploym ent can only result from governm ent
intervention. If the state mandates a minimum w age of $10 an hour, then
only those individuals with a DMVP of $ 10 or higher will find a job. All others
must remain unemployed.
Some econom ists, like Keynes, c o n te n d th a t in v o lu n ta ry
unemployment can occur on the free market. But em ploym ent is a twoparty affair. Both parties must agree to the terms of employment. If an
individual cannot find employment, it is because he cannot com e to terms
with an employer.
Hoppe points out th a t if someone can be labeled Involuntarily
unemployed on the free market, individuals can also be called involuntarily
Mercedes-less or wife-less. One remains Mercedes-less if he cannot com e
92Rothbard, Man Economy and State, pp. 523-523.
93This will never occur because of the disutility of labor.
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to terms witti a Mercedes dealer, For example, I would like a Mercedes for
$5,000, but as long as no dealer will sell m e one for this price, can I be
called involuntarily Mercedes-less? Of course not, this would turn logic on
its head. It implies that coercion is necessary to m ake one or both of the
parties com e to on agreem ent. To do so would redefine coercive to
mean voluntary and voluntary to mean c o e r c i v e . 9 4
W age rigidity is considered a market phenomenon. In fact, it is the
result of the minimum w age and governm ent privileges a c c o rd e d to
unions. Unions prevent wages from moving dow nw ard by using coercion
to prohibit non-members from entering their markets, thereby lowering the
wage. Those prohibited from entering a unionized occupation are forced
to seek less remunerative employment.95
Some counter that finding a job takes time and advertising, But this is
true of every good and service on the free market. Humans lack perfect
Information and consequently are not aw are of all possible opportunities,
Employment agencies and classified ads can facilitate employment,
The supply of capital determines how high wages can increase. In
some countries or regions of a country the supply of capital m ay not be
great enough to guarantee everyone above subsistence level wages. This
is not a deficiency of the market. It Is the result of the voluntary actions of
individuals. It may also happen th a t an individual lacks the skills or talent
required to find em ploym ent above subsistence level. These Individuals
must rely on charity for their livelihood.%

94Roppe, "Theory of Employment, Money, Interest and the Capitalist
Process," p. 113, fn. 7.
95Every individual seeks to maximize his incom e, both psychic and
monetary, while selecting a job or career. The fa c t that a union backed by
state-supported coercion can prevent him from entering his desired
occupation tells us that he must forego his most-valued option and select
the next highest option.
96Rothbard, Man Economy and State, pp. 522-528
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E c o n o m ie G ro w th

Economie growth refers to the increase in a country's per capita
national income. Shoup writes:
The rate a t which Incom e per head will grow under full
em ploym ent can be increased by public finance measures
th a t restrain certain types of consum ption, thus freeing
resources for investment in the broadest sense. Including
education, m edical care, and Improvements in the pattern
and level of nutrition for children and working-age adults that
increase their productive capacity, present or future, by more
than the cost of these improvements (all discounted to a given
date). Some of those whose consumption is restricted for this
purpose win object, not agreeing th a t the present sacrifice is
worth the gain, present a n d future, even if th a t gain
materializes in time to be enjoyed b y them rather than only by
a future generation. No consensus ca n be re ached on the
rate o f growth to be a ch ie ve d b y go vernm en t action.
(emphasis added)
While the rate of growth achie ve d without intervention may be
considered non-optimal, no reason is given. The rate of econom ic growth
in any society is determined by the time preferences of the individuals in
th a t society. In this sense a consensus has been reached. Government
action, by definition, involves the use of coercion and thus must supplant
some choices while allowing others.
What is wrong if individuals would rather n o t spend their money
a cco rd in g to the wishes of those in power? Some may agree that any
"sacrifice" is worth the gain, but only Individuals can determine whether any
alleged gain is a gain to them individually. For an economist to determine
w hat is a gain and whether that gain exceeds the sacrifice would Imply the
interpersonal comparison of utilities, clearly violating the bounds of valuefree economics.
Moreover, the conclusion that government intervention should make
up the alleged grow th deficit does not follow. This requires a value

97$houp, Public Finance, pp.38-39.
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judgm ent. Nor does it follow that such intervention will be fruitful. The
history of intervention is one of economic retardation.’ ®
Musgrave puts forward a similar point; "Individuals are said to suffer
from 'myopia,' so that, in arranging their private affairs, they underestimate
th e im p o rta n c e of saving a n d o ve re stim a te th a t of present
consum ption...H ence, the consumers' tim e discount is too high and
governm ent should correct this error by applying a lower rate."” W hat is
the proof of this myopia? Who is to say what is too high or too low? Time
preferences are entirely subjective. Further, even if this were the case, it
does not follow that government should correct this valuation.
E conom ic grow th results from savings and a legal and tax
environm ent not hostile to private property. The vo lu n ta ry tim e
preferences of individuals will determ ine th e proportion of incom e
allocated to savings and consumption. Growth results from the channeling
of savings into investment which. In turn, increases the am ount of capital
per em ployee. When more ca p ita l is consum ed than cre a te d , on
econom y will retrogress. If only enough capital is created to replace the
am ount consumed, on econom y will not grow. An overall increase will
result in a progressing economy. All the coercive sector can d o to
improve econom ic growth is to get out of the way.
The tools used to measure econom ic growth are questionable. The
most com m on statistic Is gross national product or gross domestic product.
Each of these statistics contains governm ent spending as a contributory
com ponent of production. We know the prices of such items os guns and
beer because they are sold on the market. But this is not the case for
governm ent-provided goods and services. Rather than om itting these

'’ ®Soviei Union and the formerly East Germ any are a co u ple examples
(Block, The Justification for Taxation, p. 150.) It seems only m ainstream
economists like Paul Samuelson actually believe governm ent intervention
can be a force for good. He writes; "The Soviet Economy proves that,
contrary to what the Soviets themselves may believe, a centrally planned
can function and even prosper." (Economics, 1989) While Austrians hove
been writing for decades tha t this is praxeologically impossible, others
(Samuelson et ol)have thought otherwise.
” Musgrave, Pubiic Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 181.
’ ooBlock, "Public Finance Texts Cannot Justify Government Taxation," p. 257.
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goods and services from the statistics, their production costs are equated
with the prices of goods that are actually sold on the markets
The assumption underlying these calculations is the mistaken notion
th a t costs determ ine prices, \A/ere this the cose, there would be no
business losses. But then what value can be given to such outlays? None,
if no one pays for them voluntarily, then we cannot say with any scientific
certainty th a t they have any value whatsoever. Goods and services
voluntarily purchased on the market are worth more to the consumers than
the m oney given up in exchange. But nothing even closely resembling this
occurs for governm ent-provided goods and services. Therefore, any
statistic utilizing governm ent outlays as a measure o f production or
econom ic welfare must be inherently flawed.
Moreover, GDP ca n n o t a c c o u n t for changes in quality or new
products. For most individuals w hat Is Im portant is not the am ount of
incom e they receive, but what can be purchased with this income.

M e rit G o o d s

Another basis for governm ent intervention is the merit good. While
the abse n ce of p e rfe ct co m petition m isallocates resources, some
economists co n te n d the same conditions bring a b o u t circum stances
wherein goods are not m isallocated, but a llo ca te d acco rd in g to the
principles of consum er sovereignty. O ddly enough, g o v e rn m e n t
intervention is a d v o c a te d precisely because the m arket is m eeting the
dem ands of consumers, Some of these demands should be encouraged
and others discouraged.
Musgrave writes: "While consumer sovereignty is the general rule,
situations may arise, within the context of a dem ocratic community, where
an in fo rm e d group is justified in imposing its decision on others...The
a d vantages of education are more evident to the informed than the
uninformed, thus justifying compulsion in the allocation of resources to
education...the freedom to belong may override the freedom to exclude.

10’ See Rockwell, "The Fraud of GNP."
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and so forth."i° 2 While it m ay be true the advantages of education are
more evident to the informed, it does not follow th at compulsion is justified,
In fact, this is true for almost all goods on the market. The advantages of
wine, guns and classical music are more evident to the informed. Should
these also be subsidized? The list is infinite.’ os The use of compulsion is an
ethical decision that does not follow from mere statements of fact.
Moreover, w hat are the limits on informed groups to impose their
decisions on others? Musgrave writes: "Interferences with consumer
choice may occur simply because a ruling group considers its particular set
of mores superior and wishes to impose it on others. Such determination of
wonts rests on an authoritarian basis, not permissible in our normative
model based upon a dem ocratic society."’ But don't all groups wishing to
impose their mores on others implicitly believe their values are superior to
those of the non-conformists? Why else would they want to force them on
others?
In addition, the label "merit goods" is a violation of v a lu e -fre e
economics. Economics tells us whether a good is on obje ct of human
desire. If it is sought after, it will have a price. To say th a t a good Is
meritorious requires that the economist impute a value judgment onto that
good.’ 05

P ublic G o o d s

Most econom ists a d v o c a te g o ve rn m e n t intervention in the
eco n o m y for the provision of public goods.
Presumably, w ithout
governm ent intervention these goods will not be sufficiently produced or
produced at all. This notion Is particularly striking because public goods police protection, roads and national defense - are key to the functioning
of a civilized society.

’ 02Musgrave, The Theory o f Public Finance, p. 14.
’ o^Block, "Public finance texts cannot justify government taxation," p. 247.
’ 04 Musgrave, The Theory of Pubiic Finance, p. 14.
’ o^categorizing objects into goods and bads also constitutes a value
judgment.
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While there are m any definitions of public goods, there are two
characteristics most economists can agree upon: public goods are
nonrivalrous in consumption and nonexcludable.
A nonrivalrous good is one which is not diminshed by use, like national
defense. An additional inhabitant doesn't reduce the am ount of defense
left over for others in the country.
It is impossible (or prohibitively costly) to keep the benefits of
nonexcludable goods from others. For example, if I spray my house with
co ckro a ch poison and exterm inate every cockroach, my neighbors
invariably benefit, because no cockroaches will leave my property and
invade theirs.
One result of nonexcludable goods is the presence of the free rider,
one who benefits from another's production while not com pensating the
producer. This is a positive externality, a benefit tha t ca n n o t be fully
captured by either the producer or owner. Free riders are the chief reason
public goods will be underproduced or not produced a t all if left to the free
market.
There are also negative externalities.’
These occur when the cost
of an action is not solely borne by the actor. Instead, others must also bear
some of the cost. A com m on example of this is p o llu t io n . T h e polluter
does not bear the full cost of his polluting activities since others will breathe
the air or drink the water that has been polluted. Negative externalities
increase the production of a good beyond that which would be socially
optim al.
As with positive externalities, governm ent intervention is
advocated to remedy this situation.
Externalities exist for virtually every good.’ ®® Planting flowers in one's
front yard has externalities. Some may consider them an improvement to
the street, others may consider them a detriment. The same with women's
’ 0®A distinction should be m ade betw een externalities th at uninvitedly
violate the physical integrity of one's person or property and those that do
no such thing. Uninvited physical-integrity violations are invasions. Noninvasive externalities are subjective, and their nature can change with the
changing of individuals' minds. The following discussion deals with noninvasive externalities.
’ ®70n the difference betw een invasive and non-invasive pollution, see
Rothbard, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution."
’ 0®Block, "Pubiic Goods and Externaiities," p. 2.
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makeup, designer clothes and perfume, Externalities exist in the eyes of the
beholder. The externality may be positive, negative or not even concern
an individual.
Mainstream economists are inconsistent in their application of the
externalities argum ent. If externalities call for governm ent intervention,
then governm ent intervention must not only stop at police provision,
national defense and roads, but must extend to the entire econom y as all
actions have externalities. To apply the criterion to only a few areas is
illogical and defeats the purpose of having any such criterion.’ ”
Musgrave falls victim to this criticism when he argues that "a sanitary
ca m pa ig n that raises the general level of health throughout an area"
accrues benefits to everyone, consequently "[gjovernm ent must step in,
and compulsion is called for."” ® But is compulsion called for in providing
housing, food and clothing? No. If all have similar effects on the
surrounding com munity, shouldn't they also be provided by the state?
Musgrave refuses to carry his argument to its logical conclusion.
Boadway and Wildasin are guilty of faulty reasoning. "The existence
of pure public goods, or goods simultaneously consumed by all individuals
in a given population (local, regional, national, world) provides perhaps the
strongest case for public sector intervention."” ’ But this is nothing more
than a mere statement of fact. To conclude, as they do, that coercion
can follow from a statement of fa ct is tantam ount to making the statement
that bums exist, and thus there should be government aid. The bums may
well deserve aid, but it does not follow that coercion is justified. For this to
follow one would have to introduce a norm into his chain of reasoning.
Not only do externalities exist for every action but Rothbard also
points out that everyone is a free rider:
The difficulty with this argument is that it proves far too much.
For which one of us would earn anything like our present real
incom e were it not for external benefits that we derive from
the actions of others? Specifically, the great m o d e rn
accum ulation of capital goods is an inheritance from all the
net savings of our ancestors. W ithout them , we would,
’ ” lbid., p. 6.
” ®Musgrave, Theory o f Public Finance, pp. 9-10.
’ ’ ’ Boadway and Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, p. 57.
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regardless of the quality of our own moral character, be living
in a primitive jungle. The inheritance of money capital from our
ancestors is, of course, simply inheritance in this c a p ita l
structure. We are also free riders on the present, because we
benefit from the continuing investment of our fellow men and
from their specialized skills on the market. Certainly the vast
bulk or our wages, if they could be so imputed, would be due
to this heritage on which we are free riders. The landow ner
has no more of an unearned increm ent th a t any one of us.
Are all of us to suffer confiscation, therefore, and to be taxed
for our happiness? And who then is to receive the loot? Our
d e a d ancestors who w ere our benefactors investing th e
capital?” ^
In the absence of any sort of contract, can someone who benefits
from a so-called public good be obliged to pay for it? Block gives the
exam ple of miniskirts, an unusual although com pletely analogous case.” ®
An attractive wom an in a miniskirt provides external benefits in the form of
viewing pleasure to passers-by. Should she be given the right to extract
m onetary com pensation from all those benefltting from her beauty? A
society that a c c e p te d the free-rider argum ent and its logical Implications
would quickly degenerate into chaos as it would allow the enforcem ent of
one-party contracts.” 4
A free rider is one who receives the benefits of a good or service but
knows he ca n benefit from others actions If he does not pay for these
goods and services. But it is impossible and illogical to c o n clu d e th a t
because som eone does not purchase a public good th a t he actually
wants it. This assertion oversteps the bounds of value-free science and
implies the existence of some superhuman ability to read the minds of
others. ” 5
It is not always true that some public goods have externalities that
are impossible to capture or internalize. In the case of roods, public goods
a d vo ca te s m aintain it is Impossible for the private provider to prevent
benefits from spilling over to neighboring properties. But this presents only
a minor obstacle, for developers can, before anyone Is aw are o f their
plans, purchase all the neighboring property secretly before construction
” 2Rothbard, Man Economy an d S tate, pp 888-889.
” ®Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," pp. 10-11.
” 4|bid., p. 11.
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of the road, thus making a gain possible.” ® Even if it is impossible to
purchase land along the planned route, the developer can alvvrays change
the direction of the rood, tunnel or place a bridge over the planned
route.’ ”
This is also true of police protection. Police protection does not exist
in the abstract, rather it consists of specific services provided to specific
individuals and areas. Police d o not have to patrol or provide services to
everyone in their area. If roads were privately owned, the owners could
incorporate police protection in the tolls. Many owners of apartm ent
complexes provide police protection, as do many firms. The situation can
be the same with national defense. Rothbard notes:
But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only
one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources com m itted
in certain definite and concrete w ays-and these resources
are necessarily scarce. A ring of defense bases around New
York, for example, cuts down the am ount possibly available
around San Francisco.” ®
Another Austrian contention Is that even though the free market may
result In the underinvestment of a public good. It does not follow that
governm ent should intervene to m ake up the deficit. G overnm ent
intervention is a moral conclusion that can only be brought about through
ethical arguments in one's premises, and since economics is a science of
means, not ends, such a contention necessarily violates the value-free
nature of economics.’ ”
Although some contend that the government provision of a public
good will make up any privately-produced deficit, this Is not so clear. For
once governm ent has stepped into the arena, it may discourage private
investment and society will be worse off than before.’ 2®
On the other hand, it is quite possible that government, absent from
the profit motive, m ay over-invest and thus create an altogether new

” ®lbld., p. 8
’ ’ ^Block, "Free Market Transportation," p. 218.
” ®Rothbard, Man Economy and State, p. 885.
’ ’ ’’ Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," p. 3.
12 Û I K Î H
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misallocation.” ! Witness ttie great numbers of government roads ttia t are
infrequently traveled and lead to nowhere, a clear m isallocation of
resources. Absent the profit/loss test of the free market, the governm ent
officials th a t run these projects have no incentive to structure them
according to the wishes of voluntarily paying customers.
If, as mainstream economists assert, consumers believed a public
good deficit existed, nothing prevents them from voluntarily financing the
investors th a t produce the go od in question, The fa c t tha t this never
happens tells us consumers would rather spend their money elsewhere and
th a t they value non-public goods m ore than public goods.” 2 Any
coercive financing Is bound to result in wasted resources and the provision
of goods of less than primary im portance.’ 23
Even If such a deficit is closed, it is not possible to say w hat the state
produces is actually what the public desires. The state treats all goods as
homogeneous. Thus, they provide "police services." Not guards, alarms,
security fences or door locks. Everyone's desires are treated the same.
Furthermore, no profit/loss test exists to tell the state whether their services
are actually valued by anyone.
The belief that market failure is the result of Individual failure to
register true preferences (that is, people pretend not to value the good
only to turn around and enjoy its benefits) also collapses under scrutiny.
How is it that an economist can know the true preferences of others, when
he doesn't even know all his own preferences? What of impulsive
purchases?’ 24
So how is it that economists can claim to know that individuals are
not registering their true preferences? Clearly, apart from human action, it
impossible to find one's real preferences. On this Mises writes: "[0 ]n e must
not forget th a t that scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the
reality of action. These scales have no Independent existence apart from
the a ctu a l behavior of individuals. The only source from which our

’ 2’ Ibid.
’ 22Rothbard, Man Econonny and State, p. 890.
’ 23Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 196.
’ 24Biock, "Public Goods and Externalities," p. 20.
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know ledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a
man's actions."’ 25
A n o th e r line of a rg u m e n t used to a d v o c a te g ove rn m e n t
intervention is w hat Block calls the "isolabillty condition." This occurs when
the benefits of a governm ent-provided g o o d ore so diffused th a t it is
impossible to isolate the exact persons benefited.’ 26
If no one Is willing to step forward and pay for the service, how can
anyone say th a t there are hordes of beneficiaries? Apart from actual
human action, such statements are mere conjecture and outside of the
sphere of scientific e c o n o m i c s . ’ 27
But is there any clear-cut distinction betw een public goods and
private goods? Hoppe believes otherwise.
All goods are more or less private or public and can - a n d
constantly d o - c h a n g e with respect to their degrees of
privateness/publicness with people's changing values and
evaluations, and with changes in the com position of th e
population. They never fall, o nce and for all, into either one or
the other category.’ 28
For example, the color of one's carpet, length of one's hair or type of
flowers in one's front yard can becom e a public good merely by people
caring a b o u t them. Some m ay consider these things the bearers of
negative externalities. Similarly, the m om ent they no longer core about
them, they becom e private goods.
The non-rivalrous co m po n e n t of the public-goods argum ent is a
return to the pre-subjectivist era of economics. Hoppe argues:
How could any outside observer determine whether or not the
adm ittance of on additional free rider a t no charge would not
Indeed lead to a reduction in the enjoym ent of a good by
others?! Clearly, there is no w ay that he could objectively do
so. In fact, it might well be that one's enjoyment of a movie or
driving on the road would be considerably reduced if more
people were allowed in the theater or on the rood.’ 2’
’ 25Mises, Human Action, p.95.
’ 26Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," p. 22.
’ 27|bid.
’ 28Hoppe, A Theory o f Socialism a n d Capitalism, pp. 249-250.
’ 29|bld.
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One would hove to ask every consumer of the public good whether
the good was, in fact, a non-rivalrous good. Moreover, how would one
ag g re g a te different views as to the non-rivalrous nature of the good in
question? Even If all views concerning the good were the same, it would
still be subject to change over time. What then?’ ®®
The assertion, m ade by Musgrave, th a t without police and legal
provisions a market would not be sustainable Is mistaken. It is a fallback to
the "all or nothing" era of pre-subjectivist economics. Every action occurs
at the margin. No one decides between having police protection or not
having police protection in tofo. Instead, each actor decides whether he
will purchase the good or service in question.
Furthermore, the categorization of externalities as positive or
negative is a violation of the value-free nature of economics. A positive
externality to one m ay be negative to another. For example, a left-liberal
may view roads as producers of negative externalities, because they work
against the com m unal spirit of public transportation by allowing private
transportation. On the other hand, another may consider roads as having
positive externalities because it lets him go where he might not otherwise
be able and because the automobile travel it affords saves him time. Any
atte m p t to group externalities as positive or negative is a lapse into the
fallacious theory of objective value.’ ®’
The present term inology should be a b an don e d in tavor of a m ore
m eaningful one. The term free rider is meaningless as it applies to
everyone. A good can change from public to private with the changing
valuations of individuals. And externalities exist for every action. The only
externalities th a t should m atter are those th a t uninvitedly violate th e
physical integrity of one's person or property. The more appropriate term
for the by-products of these actions is invasion.
Moreover, it should be remembered that the free market is optimal
according to the voluntary actions of all individuals, not the ethical views of
economists. Any m ove aw ay from these voluntary actions must be nonoptimal by definition.’ ®2
’ ®®lbid.
’ ®’ Block, "PuDlic finance texts cannot justify taxation," p. 238.
’ ®2Rothbard, Man Econonriy and State, p. 887.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

G o v e rn m e n t F ailu re

Government is supposed to provide the public with more of a public
good than would otherwise be supplied on the free market. But does this
ever happen?
Outside the price system, how does the governm ent know how
m uch and w hat kind of police services to provide? It doesn't. It can't tell
whether its services m eet the demands of the public; there is no profit/loss
test. Millions of dollars are spent apprehending prostitutes, non-violent drug
users and traffic violators while murderers, robbers and rapists roam the
streets. If a private police agency e n g a g ed is such activities at the utter
disregard of its customers' wishes, it would quickly go out of business. Public
police prosper because you have to pay them regardless of the quality,
quantity and type of their service.
Police departm ents take most com plaints with a grain of salt,
knowing full well th a t the com plainants ca n n o t take their patronage
elsewhere.
This is co m p o u n d e d by the fa c t th a t nothing re m o te ly
resembling a co n tra ct is given to the public concerning police procedures
and duties or recourse that can be taken if police do not fulfill their duties.
Government has outlawed privately-competing police agencies, yet
does anyo n e feel safer because of this? The drastic increase in the
purchase of firearms, security systems a n d private patrols su gg est
otherwise. There are more than tw ice as m any private police as public
police in the United States.’ ®®
Public police are often accused of gross negligence, inefficiency
and brutality. According to a study performed by the Police Foundation
and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in 1976,
more than half of on officer's time is spent on conversations with other
officers, personal errands and sitting parked on side streets.’ ®^
Situations will arise in governm ent provision that would never be
tolerated on the market. After 40% of Washington, D.C. police cadets
’ ®®Benson, Enterprise of Law, p. 2
’ 34|bid., p. 134.
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failed the final exam in 1988, it was abolished. Tucker Carlson, a reporter
for the Wall Street Journal, writes: "All this had a predictable e ffect on the
caliber of Washington cops. 'I saw people who were practically illiterate,'
says Mike Hubbard, a detective who spent five years training recruits, 'I've
seen people diagnosed as borderline-retarded graduate from the police
academy.'"” ®
In an age of forced equality everyone is given an equal opportunity.
Even c a d e t applicants with youthful criminal pasts aren't prohibited from
joining the force. Not surprisingly, Carlson notes "Last year, 36 officers were
Indicted on charges such as dope dealing, sexual assault, murder, sodomy,
and kidnapping...." The weak are also encouraged to join the force: The
departm ent does not require strength or endurance tests. It Is unlikely that
anyone would voluntarily pay for such ineptitude, yet anything is possible
once paym ent is severed from service.
What is even more striking is that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1856
that government has no duty to protect anyone [South v. Maryland, 59 U.S.
(HOW) 396, 15 L.Ed., 433 (1856)].” ®
The Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in 1982:
...there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state
against being m urdered by criminals or m adm en. It is
monstrous if the state fails to protect Its residents against such
predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Am endment or, we suppose, any other provision of
the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter o f negative
liberties: it teiis the state to let people alone; it does not require
the federal governm ent or the state to provide services, even
so ele m en ta ry a service as m aintaining law a n d order.
[emphasis a d d e d ]” 7
State and local governments can't even be held liable for failing to
establish p o lice departm ents. Personal p rote ctio n is an individual
responsibility. Even so, the courts have upheld state and local laws that
restrict or prevent citizens from owning firearms for personal protection.” ®
” ®Tucker Carlson, Wail Street Journal, 3 November 1993.
” ®D/a/ 911 a n d Die!, p. 110.
” 7|bid.
” ®While it is true th a t most localities do not prohibit gun ownership, almost
all prohibit concealed carry permits or limit them to celebrities or friends of
politicians and the sheriff.
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Take the case of Linda Riss. Terrorized for several months by her exboyfriend, who hod a criminal record, Ms. RIss repeatedly sought police
protection. A resident of New York City, she was forbidden to own a
weapon. When she feared imminent attack, she once again pleaded with
the authorities for police protection. She was denied. The next day a man
hired by her ex-boyfriend threw lye In her face, permanently blinding her in
one eye and scarring her.
Ms. Riss unsuccessfully sued the city of New York for failure to protect
her. Judge Keating of the Court of Appeals of New York, in dissent, noted:
W hat m akes th e city's position pa rticularly d iffic u lt to
understand is that, in conform ity to the dictates of the law,
Linda did not carry any w eapon for self-defense. Thus, by a
rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the
City of New York, which now denies all responsibility to her [Riss
V . City of New York, 293 N.Y. 2d 897 (1968)]” ’
The justice system is p la g u e d with in efficiency.
Courts are
overcrow ded and case resolution ca n take years. Consequently, there
has been an astronomical increase in the use of private arbitration services
for com mercial disputes. Arbitration services handle more than 75 percent
of commercial disputes. Their services cost less In money and time. Private
arbitrators are usually prominent members of their field, rather than judges.
Consequently, they are more kn ow ledgeable in their fields, further
reducing the amount of time required to hear a case.” ®
Prisons are no better than courts. Overcrowding is so ram pant that
the state must release hard-core criminals to m ake room for the hordes of
non-violent criminals they legislate into existence every year. Restitution is
rarely paid. Instead, all fines accrue to the coffers of the state. Adding
insult to injury, the criminal Is imprisoned at taxpayer expense and is usually
never asked to pay one cent for his upkeep.
While m any cannot foresee the market undertaking the provision of
security, it was foreseen by the brilliant 19th century B e lg ia n -b o rn
economist Gustave de Molinari who outlined the terms of such agreements
as follows:
” ’ D /a /9 //, p. 110.
’ 4®Benson, The Enterprise o f Law, p. 2
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In order to be able to guarantee the consumers full security for
their persons and property, and, In case of harm, to give them
a compensation proportioned to the loss suffered, it would be
necessary, indeed:
1. That the producer establish certain penalties against
the offenders of persons and the violators of property, and
that the consumers agree to submit to these penalties, in case
they themselves com m it offenses;
2. That he impose certain inconveniences on the
consumers, with the o b ject of facilitating the discovery of the
authors of offenses;
3. That he regularly gather, in order to cover his costs of
production as well as an appropriate return for his efforts, a
certain sum, variable a c c o rd in g to the situation of the
consumers, the particular occupations they engage in, and
the extent, value and nature of their properties.
If these terms, necessary for carrying on this industry, are
a g re e a b le to the consumers, a bargain will b e struck.
Otherwise, the consumers will either do without security, or else
apply to another producer.” !
Historical evidence suggests tha t law, courts and police protection
have all been provided in the past without government. Celtic Ireland (until
the 17th century). West New Guinea (up to this day), England (before the
Norman Invasion) and m edieval Iceland are all cases of the private
provision of these most essential services.

In c o m e Redistribution

Incom e redistribution supposedly makes the outcomes of the free
m arket more equitable.’ 42 jo Austrians, all market exchanges within the
boundaries of the non-aggression axiom are
production and distribution are inseparable.
p roduce or attain property through voluntary
owners and controllers of their property. No

just. In the free market
Those who homestead,
exchange are the sole
room is left for p o litic a l

!4i Molinari, The Production o f Security, p. 13. See in particular Rothbard, For
o New Liberty; Friedman, Machinery o f Freedom; Morris and Linda Tannehill,
Market for Liberty, and Benson, The Enterprise o f Law.
!42what is equitable is a given rather than presented as the conclusion of
any coherent system of ethics.
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manipulation of any sort, Tfius, governm ent and the subsequent right to
vote need not exist in a society that affirms private property rights, for the
masses use these institutions to control property over which they have no
rightful claim.
Due and Friedlaender mention tw o types of incom e redistribution:
Pareto optim al and ethical. Pareto optim al redistributions m ake some
better off while making none worse off, and ethical incom e redistributions
cannot make some better off without making others worse off.
There are tw o theoretical justifications for Pareto optim al incom e
redistributions: (1) income redistribution m ay be a public good; and (2) the
rich m ay be interdependent on the econom ic well-being of the poor.
Incom e redistribution may be considered a public good if It enters into
individual utility functions. From the existence of the social welfare function,
i.e., the consensus of the political process, they argue th a t "individuals'
welfare is in some sense d e p e n d e n t upon the incom e distribution of
s o c ie ty ..."!”
They co n clu d e governm ent intervention is n e e d e d to
overcom e the free-rider problem and ensure society reaches its utility
possibility frontier.
This analysis fails on several counts. First, no coercive a c t of incom e
redistribution ca n ever be Pareto superior from the m ere fa c t th a t
coercion is involved. Second, utility functions do not exist; the only way an
econom ist can determ ine w hether an a c t o f in com e redistribution
improves the giver's utility is if the a c t itself Is voluntary. Third, the existence
of free riders cannot justify intervention.
Similarly, they argue incom e redistribution m ay be a p o sitive
externality. This Is the case If the utilities of the rich are interdependent on
the incom e levels of the poor. Reasons given for this interdependency
include avoidance of slums and political instability. That an individual's well
being is also dependent on his level of income restricts the size of voluntary
contributions to the poor. To overcom e this, the state must step in and
collect tax dollars from the rich for distribution to the poor. To illustrate, they
write:
[Sjuppose that there are N rich people and Q p o o r people in
society. If a rich person voluntarily gives up one dollar to be
!” Due, Government Finance, p. 121.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
equally divided am ong the poor, each poor person receives
7/Q^^of a dollar. If all rich people give up on dollar collectively
through the government, each poor person receives A//Q^^of
a dollar.’ 44
From this they conclude that while the welfare loss in both instances is
the same, i.e, in each case the rich person gives up one dollar, the welfare
gain is greater in the latter situation because the rich person knows that
state intervention will collect more funds for each poor person.
This justification also falls on several counts. First, it is impossible to
determ ine whether a person's welfare is somehow related to the well
being of another, absent any market interaction. Even a voluntary a c t of
giving would only indicate a momentary Interdependency, not some long
standing relationship. Second, it is m isleading to e q u a te voluntary
donations with involuntary taxation. An individual who gives up a dollar
voluntarily benefits ex ante, otherwise he would not have given up the
dollar. But we cannot conclude that the rich person benefits from giving
up one dollar to the state because the transaction involves coercion.
Third, welfare interdependency by itself cannot justify state intervention; this
requires a value judgment.
Due and Friedlaender further state that even if perfect com petition
existed, society m ay not view its outco m e as "ethically de sirable ."” 5
Therefore, "the governm ent m ay have to impose redistributive taxes or
subsidies not only to ensure that society reaches its preferred point on the
utility possibility frontier, but also to ensure th a t society In fa c t reaches its
production possibility and utility possibility frontiers."’ ”
Their analysis is p red ica te d on the existence of utility possibility
frontiers. The fa c t that these frontiers have no relevance to human action
is not broached. Neither is much attention given to what constitutes on
ethical system from which to judge market allocations. Apparently, any
ethical system will do, so long as It results from the democratic process. The
possibility th a t the undesirable outcom e m ay not be the result of ethical
undesirability but sheer envy is not questioned.

’ 44|bid., p. 122.
’ 45|bid., p. 119.
’ 4®lbld.
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Moreover, why should anyone care th at "society" considers the
distribution of wealth "socially undesirable?" If one looked hard enough,
any distribution could be found undesirable by some elem ent of society.
No one has a monopoly on envy. Precedence should not be given to the
masses as any system of ethics th a t changed with the changing of minds
would be tyranny, not ethics. The on/y question one should consider when
speaking of income distribution is whether the distribution was the result of
voluntary, non-invasive actions or whether it was the result of coercion.
Income redistribution is an affront to the free market. It negates the
voluntary valuations of consumers. Mises writes that cries for incom e
equality are based more on greed and envy than pure ethical grounds:
The inequality of incomes and wealth is an inherent feature of
the market economy. Its elimination would entirely destroy the
m arket economy. W hat those people who ask for equality
have in mind is always an increase in their own power to
consume. In endorsing the principle of equality as a political
postulate nobody wants to share his own income with those
who have less. When the Am erican w age earner refers to
equality, he means th a t the dividends of stockholders should
be given to him. He does not suggest a curtailment of his own
incom e for the benefit of those 95 per cent of the earth's
population whose income is lower than his.” /
Inequality Is something to be cherished, not scorned. Were it not for
inequality, man would hove had little Incentive to form society. Each
person would go his own way, isolated from everyone else. O n c e
individuals realized they could benefit from the skills and talents of others,
the seeds of civilization were planted. Inequality leads to the division of
labor and the subsequent increase in the standard of living. Any attem pt to
derail the division of labor through forced equality is a move to w a rd
barbarism.” ®
Why stop a t incom e redistribution? The burden, it seems, is on the
egalitarian to prove why egalitarianism must stop at income. Why not
extend it to all other areas of one's life? How about cognitive or facial

” 7Mises, Human Action, p. 840.
” ®See Rothbard, "Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism and the Division of
Labor.
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e q u a l i t y ? ”

9 !5 0

|\io coercive a c t of incom e distribution can be said to

benefit social welfare because sucti an a c t requires ttia t one party lose
wtiile anottier gains.
Furttiermore, incom e redistribution foils the Pareto criterion as
taxation is required either directly or indirectly in the form of subsidies to
alter any given allocation. Any a tte m p t to alter the voluntary "incom e
distribution" of the market through state actions must be viewed as invasive
and treated as such.

T a x a tio n

A ccording to the texts, taxation has both substitution and incom e
effects. These forces have opposite effects: The substitution e ffe c t
increases the incentive to engage in leisure and consumption by increasing
the costs associated with work, while the incom e e ffe c t increases the
incentive to work by reducing m oney incom e and thereby increasing the
m arginal utility a tta c h e d to e a ch dollar. Whether either e ffe c t will
dom inate the other is an em pirical question.” ’ Thus, not all taxes will
adversely affect production. But is this really an empirical question?
W hat is missing from this analysis is the universal fa c t of time
preference: Every a c t of taxation coercively increases the effective rate
of time preference by reducing one's current as well as future incom e,
thereby increasing the disutility of waiting. In addition, man must not only
choose betw een production or leisure, but betw een producing with
quicker, less p ro d u c tiv e processes or longer, m ore p ro d u c tiv e
p r o c e s s e s . ’ 52 The higher the time preference, the shorter the time structure

’ 49piew, The Politics o f Procrustes, pp. 22,58.
’ 50Qn the logical extension of egalitarianism, see Vonnegut, "Harrison
Bergeron."
’ 51Hyman, Pubiic Finance, pp. 464-467.
’ 52Lengthening th e structure of p ro d u ctio n necessitates th a t this
lengthening be undertaken with the idea tha t these processes be more
productive. No one would lengthen the production structure if th a t
lengthening yielded a less productive process. The longer processes
require savings to sustain the actors while they cre ate cap ital goods.
Without savings, these individuals would starve because the rewards of
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of production, Witti this in mind, the effects of taxation ore no longer in
doubt, The higher marginal utility placed on dollars will push individuals to
obtain them more quickly. This can be accom plished through shorter
periods of production, thereby increasing leisure time, or by obtaining
m oney through political m eans.” 3 Both m ethods adversely im p a c t
production.’ 54
Furthermore, the incom e effect increases the tendency to engage
in barter tra d e since such trades escape ta xa tio n .’ 55 This should be
distinguished from above-ground putative barter exchanges. First, these
exchanges utilize barter credits and thus obviate the double coincidence
of wonts exclusive to barter trade but alien to m oney-based econom ic
systems. Second, these transactions ore taxable and consequently less
conducive to tax evasion. Taxation primarily affects underground barter.
Barter trade Is a retrogression to the primitive living conditions of the post,
for the double coincidence of wonts precludes rational, money-based
cost accounting.’ 56
Taxation also Increases the incentive to e n g a g e in non-barter
underground employment. An underground firm cannot be as productive
as a com parative unfettered, above-ground firm because the former must
forego the benefits of econom ies of scale. Should such a firm ta k e
advantage of these economies, it opens itself to possible discovery. These
factors, com bined with the substitution effect, push individuals to engage in
lengthy periods of production can take weeks, months or years before
fructification (See Richard von StrigI, Capital and Production).
’ 5®Taxation has profound sociological Implications. The existence of a
group of individuals having the legal sanction to plunder immediately raises
the costs of homesteading, producing and contracting. Conversely, the
costs of non-hom esteading, non-producing and non-contracting are
lowered. Individuals will tend to m ove from the former positions to the
iotter, for one can nov/ engage in these predatory practices with impunity
so long as he plays by the state's rules. (Hoppe, "The Economics and
Sociology of Taxation, p. 35)
’ 54Hoppe, "The Economics and Sociology of Taxation," pp. 31-35.
’ 55|bid., p. 34.
’ 56To illustrate, imagine a firm th a t a c c e p te d every possible good as
paym ent, e.g., bananas, tires, and shoes. How can the entrepreneur
determine whether he has a m ade a profit or loss? Clearly, what's missing is
a com m on denominator, a com m on medium of exchange. Until this is
established, only subsistence standards-of-living are sustainable (See
Salerno, "Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized").
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leisure and consum ption and shorter rather than longer, roundabout
m e th o d s o f p ro d u c tio n .
This is a p rescrip tio n for e c o n o m ic
impoverishment,
The proxeologicoi theories of taxation refer not to absolute levels of
production, but relative ones, A society th a t has a state-sanctioned
parasite class will have a lower standard of living relative to the standard of
living possible with lower taxation or absent taxation. Every tax or tax
increase necessarily pushes society closer and closer to the barbaric past
of hand-to-mouth existence.

Tax Equity
On the necessity of tax equity, Musgrave writes: "Everyone agrees
th a t the tax system should be equitable, i.e., th a t e a ch taxpayer should
contribute his or her 'fair share' to the cost of government."i57
Musgrave argues that one m ethod of achieving tax equity is through
the application of the benefit p r i n c i p l e . i s s
f a x regime of this sort would
tax everyone according to their valuation of governm ent services. "Unless
the good in question is w hat economists call an 'inferior' good, consumer
valuation m ay be expected to rise with i n c o m e . 5 9 The assumption here is
that the rich benefit more from state than the poor, but this could only be
the case if their incomes were dependent on the state. This is true for the
holders of m onopoly grants and subsidies, but not for everyone else.
Welfare recipients would hove to pay a tax covering their dole and the
a c c o m p a n y in g bureaucratic costs. M onopoly holders fa ce the same
predicam ent. What's the purpose in having such privileges and largesse if
their beneficiaries must pay for them?i60
Yet, can there ever be tax equity? The political philosopher John C.
Calhoun noted tw o types of individuals: taxpayers and t a x c o n s u m e r s . i ^ i

T57Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, p, 227.
i58|bid„p, 228,
i59|bid„ p, 229.
i50Rothbard, Power a n d Market, pp. 154-156.
i5iLence, Union a n d Liberty: The Poiiticai Philosophy o f John C. Calhoun, pp.
17-19.
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Individuals who receive port or oil their incom e from the state are
toxconsumers. Those who receive more in taxes than they pay are net
taxconsumers and those who pay more than they receive are net
taxpayers, As long os state employees receive their income from taxes,
tax equity is out of the question, This is because state employees do not
pay taxes. Rather, their incomes are paid out of taxes.i62

Tax Incidence
Austrian insights into the nature of tax incidence differ from tha t of
mainstream economists. According to mainstream economists, a sales tax
can be shifted forw ard onto consumers, either partially or entirely,
Austrians assert otherwise.
In the texts, a sales "tax,,,forms a w edge betw een the gross or
market price paid by the buyer and the net price received by the seller.
Since the a d valorem is a function of price, it must now be shown as a
change in the dem and schedule. Moreover, since the tax is determined as
a percentage of price, the adjustment is reflected in a swivel rather than a
shift of the schedule."i63 This analysis violates the ceteris paribus restriction.
There is no reason to assume tha t the dem and curve has ch a n g e d in
response to the the tax: The dem and curve is a given and all econom ic
effects ore d e d uced from this fact. 1^4
A producer sets a price for his product at the point he believes net
revenue will be maximized. He does not charge a higher price because
he believes the dem and above the chosen price is elastic.^^5 To charge a
higher price, ceteris paribus, would result in a loss of net revenue. When a
soles tax or soles tax increase is enacted, the producer ca nn ot raise his
prices without incurring a loss in revenue. Of course, this does not m ean
152To illustrate, imagine that taxes are abolished one year, How would state
employees pay their taxes? They couldn't because their incomes are
d e p e n d e n t on taxes. That state employees' paychecks reflect tax
withholding is merely an accounting fiction.
i63[y|usgrave. Public Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 270.
i64|-|oppe, "The Economics and Sociology of Taxation," pp. 37-38.
i55jf producers can effortlessly shift taxes onto consumers, then one must
ask: Why wait for the tax or tax increase to raise prices?
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that he won't try to do so. But if demand has not changed in the meantime,
producers must experience unsold surpluses at the higher prices.^ 56
At first, the entire burden is borne by the producer. The DMVP of
factors of the taxed industries will be reduced. Non-specific factors will
move to higher-rem unerative industries.^57 Marginal firms will exit the
industry. Firms that don't exit the industry will reduce production due to
decreased profitability. As the number of producers and the incentive to
p ro d u c e diminishes, so will the the supply of their p ro d u ct and,
consequently, prices will increase.''58 Thus, consumers bear part of the
burden from sales taxes, but in no sense is the tax shifted onto them, for
shifting implies ease and directness and this is clearly not the case.

156a general sales tax cannot increase the overall level of prices. Such on
occurrence requires th a t everyone spend more on everything. This is
impossible without counterfeiting-induced inflation or without a decrease in
the demand for money.
i57Some factors m ay find a higher DMVP In other industries, particularly in
those where the tax proceeds are spent, in the long run, "loss[es] in gross
revenue [ore] imputed back to interest income by capitalists and to wages
and rents earned by original factors-labor and ground land. (Rothbard,
Power and Market, p. 90.
i58Rothbord, Power and Market, pp. 88-93.
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CHAPTER V

C o n clu sio n .

The errors of public finance are fundam ental and ca n be summed
up as follows:
(1) the use of interpersonal utility comparisons
(2) violating the wertfrei nature of economics by deriving ethical
judgments from purely econom ic postulates
(3) the failure to provide a starting point for Pareto optimality
(4) the failure to provide a theory of property rights or a theory
of ethics from which to make value judgments
(5) the failure to use the individual as the starting point of all
economic analyses
(6) aping the epistemology of physics in the use of econom ic
assumptions
Economics cannot justify any role of the state. Any a c t of the state
must, by definition, involve coercion. The state can only benefit Peter by
robbing Paul. As such, all state actions involve winners and losers. The
impossibility o f interpersonal welfare comparisons prevents us from saying
whether the utility gains of the winners outweigh the losses of the losers.
In addition, for an economist to a d vo ca te state intervention on the
basis of e co n o m ic analysis necessarily violates the value-free nature of
econom ics.
As a d v o c a te s of state intervention, econom ists q u a
consultants are com plicit in the m ulcting and predatory practices of the
s t a t e . 159,170
They are no better than the individual who aides thieves by
consulting with them on the best methods with which to rob their victims.

i590n the impossibility of value-free consulting, see Rothbard, Toward A
Reconstrucfion, p. 25.
i70The term "predatory practices" has been reserved exclusively for the
actions of cutthroat firms. This is incorrect. As we have seen, all actions of
the state involve predations. The state is the true predator.
70
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Economists must put on end to their role as state apologists, This will
go far to overturn the negative im age of economists presented by Mises:
"The d e v e lo p m e n t of a profession of economists is an offshoot of
interventionism. The professional econom ist is the specialist who is
instrumental in designing various measures of government interference with
business. He is on expert in the field of econom ic legislation, which today
invariably aims at hindering the operation of the market economy."'7i

'I'l Mises, Human Action, p. 869.
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